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ABSTRACT 
 
Turkey has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and became a 
candidate country for the EU membership in 1999. It is only recently that empirical 
studies focusing on the Turkish attitudes towards the EU membership have emerged. The 
existing literature fails to provide a clear and comprehensive picture of Turkish public 
opinion on the EU. Hence, this study examines the determinants of Turkish public 
support for the EU membership over the past decade. Using Eurobarometer and 
Transatlantic Trends surveys, I test whether theories of support for EU integration that 
were developed to study attitudes in Western Europe and Eastern Europe are applicable 
to explain the Turkish case. In particular, I emphasize three major factors: economic 
considerations (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998), domestic political 
considerations (Anderson 1998), and identity (McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004). 
The analysis of longitudinal data shows that while economic evaluations are good 
predictors of attitudes, the effect of sociotropic evaluations is not static since they change 
character over time, and that human capital variables do not play a role in the formation 
of attitudes. The results show that attitudes towards EU are strongly shaped by proxies 
rooted in domestic policies, such as trust in national government and party cues. The 
results also suggest that in the presence of elite consensus, the support for the EU 
membership was high while when the elite consensus decreased, the level of public 
support also decreased. Finally, this analysis demonstrates that Turks’ concern about the 
potential loss of their cultural identity has a significant impact on their attitudes. 
v 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor and committee chair 
Professor Susan Scarrow for her help and guidance all through the dissertation journey. I 
was fortunate enough to work with an accomplished academician who is curious to learn, 
eager to explore new research, and humble enough to bring her students all along. Simply 
said, her persistence, patience, and empathy were a great motivation that made this 
dissertation possible.  
I would also like to express my thanks to Dr. Timothy Hellwig, who in his 
capacity as my instructor and committee member, never hesitated to dive into the 
methodology, revise analysis results, and provide directions. I am also thankful to my 
committee members Dr. Elizabeth Simas and Dr. Jonathan Slapin whose valuable 
comments helped me improve and enrich my thesis.  
I thank my parents, Sevim and Yusuf Gezgör, greatly who always showed 
unconditional support and who always believed in me during the most difficult times. I 
owe special thanks to my husband Maher Lahmar who at first place inspired me and 
guided me to continue my studies since I was an undergraduate student in the Political 
Science Department at Bilkent University, and who took good care of the kids when I 
needed extra time to work on the dissertation. My daughter Yasmin and my son Kerim 
became a source of motivation to complete my dissertation and find a job I love.  
I also would like express my appreciation to Anna Mikulska and Anjali Kanojia 
for their friendship and support all through the years.  Finally, I am indebted to the 
vi 
 
faculty, graduate students, and staff members in the Department of Political Science at 
the University of Houston that were always helpful, kind and friendly that made this 
arduous journey a pleasant one. 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. vii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x 
CHAPTER 1 –  Introduction............................................................................................... 1 
Turkey’s Relations with the EU and the Turkish Political Scene ................................... 5 
Dissertation Plan ........................................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER 2 – Theories Revisited: the Case of Turkey .................................................. 13 
Economic Considerations ............................................................................................. 16 
Domestic Political Considerations ................................................................................ 20 
Identity .......................................................................................................................... 22 
Literature on Turkish Public Opinion ........................................................................... 23 
Understanding Evolving Attitudes ................................................................................ 28 
The Changing Contexts: External and Internal Influences ........................................... 28 
The Incumbent AKP ..................................................................................................... 29 
Economic Growth in Turkey and Economic Crisis in Europe ..................................... 31 
Hypotheses: Explaining Turkish Public Opinion Support for EU ................................ 32 
Studying the Dynamics of Turkish Public Opinion ...................................................... 36 
CHAPTER 3 – Analysis of Determinants of Turkish Public Support for the EU ............ 38 
Introducing the Data ..................................................................................................... 38 
Changing Turkish Attitudes towards the EU ................................................................ 39 
Explaining Public Opinion in 2012............................................................................... 42 
Exploring Changes in Turkish Attitudes towards the EU Over Time .......................... 51 
Economic Considerations ............................................................................................. 51 
Domestic Political Considerations ................................................................................ 52 
Human Capital .............................................................................................................. 52 
Identity .......................................................................................................................... 53 
EU meaning .................................................................................................................. 53 
System Support ............................................................................................................. 55 
Explaining the Longitudinal Changes In the Model ..................................................... 57 
viii 
 
Highlights of Main Findings ......................................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER 4 – Party Support and Attitudes towards the EU ........................................... 71 
Changing Turkish Party Attitudes towards the EU....................................................... 71 
Introducing the Data ..................................................................................................... 76 
Changing Turkish Attitudes towards the EU ................................................................ 78 
Model and Variables ..................................................................................................... 80 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 81 
Testing the Effect of Party Support Over Time ........................................................ 81 
Re-testing the Impact of Economic Variables Over Time ........................................ 85 
Testing the Party Effect and Re-testing the Impact of Economic Variables by Using 
Pooled Data ............................................................................................................... 86 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 87 
CHAPTER 5 – Conclusion ............................................................................................... 94 
Main Findings ............................................................................................................... 94 
Domestic Political Considerations ............................................................................ 94 
Economic Considerations ......................................................................................... 96 
Identity ...................................................................................................................... 99 
The Challenges of Imperfect Data .............................................................................. 100 
Conclusions and Implications for Policy and Research .............................................. 102 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 106 
DATASETS USED ......................................................................................................... 114 
APPENDIX –  Survey Questions and Responses ........................................................... 120 
Eurobarometer Surveys ............................................................................................... 120 
Transatlantic Trends Survey ....................................................................................... 122 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1 Hypotheses about Public Support for EU Membership…………………….…44 
Table 3.2 Ordered Probit Models of Turkish Public Support for the EU in 2012…….…62 
Table 3.3a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU, 2002-2006……………63 
Table 3.3b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU, 2007-2012……………64 
Table 3.4a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: the Role of EU’s 
Meaning, 2002-2006…….……………………...………………………………………..65 
Table 3.4b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: the Role of EU’s 
Meaning, 2007-2012…….…………………...…………………………………………..66 
Table 3.5 Ordered Probit Model of Turkish Support for the EU: the Role of Satisfaction 
with Democracy in Turkey………………………………………………………………67 
Table 3.6 Ordered Probit Model of Turkish Public Support for the EU: the Role of Pride 
in Nationality…...………………………………………………………………..………68 
Table 3.7 Change in Predicted Probabilities……………………………………………..69 
Table 3.8 Multi-level Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistic Regression……….……………...70 
Table 4.1 Results of Turkish Parliamentary Elections for the years 2002, 2007 and 
2011....................................................................................................................................74 
Table 4.2 Demographics of Party Constituents in the Study…………………………….75 
 
Table 4.3a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences, 2002-
2006………………………………………………………………………………………89 
Table 4.3b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences, 2007-
2013…………………………………………………………………..…………………..90 
Table 4.4 Change in Predicted Probabilities…………………………………….……… 91 
Table 4.5 Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences…….. 92 
 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1 Public Support for the EU, 2002-2012………………………………….……40 
Figure 3.2 Comparison of GDP growth rate for Turkey and Euro 18………….………..59 
Figure 4.1 Public Support for the EU, 2002-2013 ………………………………………79 
Figure 4.2 Level of Public Support for the EU, by Political Party 2002-2013………….79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 –  
Introduction 
 
When the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the objective was to modernize 
and to reach the level of contemporary civilization. Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, 
believed that Westernization was the road to be chosen. In pursuit of these goals, Turkey 
applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.  
In addition, Turkey joined the Council of Europe in 1949.  It became one of the founding 
members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
1961 and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1973. In 
that regard, applying for membership in EEC was the next step to be part of Europe. 
Muftuler-Bac (2007) states that Greece application for associate member status was also 
a factor in Turkish application for associate membership. Turkey applied for full 
European Economic Community membership in 1987.  Since 1999, Turkey has been an 
official EU candidate member. Yet despite this long courtship, ordinary Turks do not 
necessarily look favorably on EU membership. According to Eurobarometer surveys, 
public support for the EU among the Turkish public dropped from 67 % in 2002 to 36 % 
in 2011. Why has this changed, and what are the determinants of public opinion in 
Turkey towards the EU? To what extent are theories of support for EU integration that 
were developed to study attitudes in Western Europe and Eastern Europe applicable to 
explain the Turkish case? These are the questions I want to answer in this dissertation. 
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In the early years of the EEC/EU application, permissive consensus was the norm 
in regards to European Communities matters throughout Europe. Citizens did not have 
much knowledge and they trusted the political elite to make decisions on their behalf 
(Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998).  Public support for the European project 
began to erode across Europe following the Maastricht agreement in 1992. Eichenberg 
and Dalton (2007, 139) use the term “Post-Maastricht Blues” to define the transformation 
of citizen support. A more recent study (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014) draws attention to 
the decline in EU support in the aftermath of the recession of 2007. According to surveys, 
58 percent of people living in EU member states said membership was a good thing in 
2007 but by 2011 this number had dropped to 47 percent.  Over the years, as the EU was 
deepening and enlarging, people became more aware of the EU’s impact in their lives.  
As a result, public opinion started to influence the integration process through lobbying, 
public protest, elections and referendums. Hence, the study of public attitudes first 
conceptualized as public support, later as Euroscepticism, has generated a great deal of 
scholarly interest. Euroscepticism is defined as ranging from contingent or qualified 
opposition to outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration 
(Taggart 1998, 366).  In their seminal study of Euroscepticism in candidate states of 
Central and Eastern European countries, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004, 3) differentiated 
between “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism. According to them, “hard” Euroscepticism 
implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic 
integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or remaining a member of the EU 
whereas “soft” involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration. It 
3 
 
may take the form of ‘policy’ Euroscepticism or ‘national-interest’ Euroscepticism, 
although these often overlap. 
As in the member states in the early years of European integration, permissive 
consensus was the initial norm in the background of Turkey-EU relations. Hence, many 
studies of Turkish attitudes towards the EU (McLaren 2000; McLaren and Muftuler-Bac 
2003; Senyuva 2011) focused on elite opinion in different time periods rather than 
looking at general public attitudes. The main focus of research in this area has been on 
technicalities of the negotiation process and EU citizens’ attitudes towards Turkish 
accession (De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko, 2008; Gerhards and Hans, 2011; 
McLaren 2007).  This permissive consensus began to change in the twenty-first century. 
The European debate first appeared on the Turkish public agenda when the Turkish 
parliament discussed several reform packages in order to meet the political aspects of 
Copenhagen criteria between 2001 and 2004.  Furthermore, the inclusion of Turkey in the 
Candidate Countries Eurobarometer of the European Commission in 2001 made clear 
that what the Turkish public thinks had become of interest for Brussels as well (Senyuva 
2006). Hence, we now have a lot more data if we want to study what Turkish people 
think about the European Union. However, until recently only a few studies empirically 
examined Turkish attitudes towards the EU (Kentmen, 2008; Kentmen and Carkoglu 
2011; Jolly and Oktay 2012). Moreover, some of the studies were descriptive, some 
focused on one point in time while some used pooled data (Carkoglu 2003; Kentmen 
2008; Yilmaz 2011). Furthermore, the studies that have been conducted have used 
different datasets, whose different variables have produced different results.  As a result, 
many questions remain about what shaped Turkish attitudes towards Europe.  To remedy 
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this shortcoming, this dissertation will test the main theories from the existing literature, 
asking whether Turkish public opinion is driven by proxies, by domestic political 
considerations, economic calculus or concerns about the loss of cultural identity. I will 
utilize Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 2002 and 2012 and Transatlantic 
Trends surveys conducted between 2004 and 2013, using longitudinal data to establish 
which factors account for long-terms changes in attitudes.  
Understanding the nature of public sentiments toward the EU in the candidate 
countries is important for several reasons. First, although not necessarily constitutionally 
mandated, candidate countries are likely to hold referendums  once negotiations over 
accession are concluded and final decisions made about whom to admit and when.   This 
is true for Turkey but also for future candidate members - and possibly for current 
members holding referendums on opting out, as the UK is threatening to do. Second, EU 
membership appears prominently in partisan debates and electoral appeals. Third, 
successful transition to prospective membership necessitates citizens’ commitment to 
market economy and consolidation of democracy. (Slomczynski, and Shabad 2003). The 
Copenhagen criteria require that the candidate country adopt the entire body of EU laws, 
known as the acquis communautaire and support the political, economic, and monetary 
aims of the European Union. The adoption, implementation and enforcement of EU’s 
legislation cannot be carried out without public support. In terms of research implication, 
a single case study of a candidate country will provide the opportunity to test theories of 
EU support, review the existing approaches and improve our understanding of support for 
the EU in a different context.  
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In addition to being a candidate country, Turkey is an interesting case for many 
other reasons as well. Turkey is a democratic and secular state with a predominantly 
Muslim population. Turkey is the only candidate country that EU established Customs 
Union without membership. Turkey has been waiting to become a member for a long 
time, longer than any other candidate in the history of EU. Furthermore, the negotiations 
are defined as open-ended, and the outcome cannot be guaranteed (European Council 
2005). While some in the EU have questioned whether full membership for Turkey is 
really credible under EU membership standards, in Turkey this long process has led to 
the perception that EU is using double standard towards Turkey’s accession (Muftuler-
Bac 2007). When the EU opened negotiations between Turkey and the EU in 2005, 
arguments about the definition of European or European-ness came to the forefront 
(Muftuler-Bac, and Taskin 2007). Turkey’s accession is considered as one of the most 
contentious issues in contemporary Europe.( De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko, 
2008) 
Turkey’s Relations with the EU and the Turkish Political Scene 
Since attitudes towards the EU are formed and shaped in the context of Turkish-
EU relations, it is useful to begin with a brief overview of Turkey’s relations with the EU.  
In 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership to join the European Economic 
Community (EEC). In 1963, Turkey and the EEC signed the Association agreement 
known as the Ankara Agreement that aimed to create a customs union between Turkey 
and the EU. The customs union was seen as a step toward membership. In 1987, Turkey 
applied to become a full member in the EEC. In 1995, the customs union came into 
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effect. In 1997, the European Council in Luxembourg reaffirmed Turkey’s eligibility for 
membership. In 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate country by the 
Helsinki European Council. In 2001, the Accession Partnership for Turkey was 
established.  Since then accession negotiation has been revised three times: in 2003, 2006 
and 2008. Turkey’s candidate status marked the beginning of a series of extensive 
constitutional and legislative reforms. 
Kalaycioglu (2011) states that coalition governments proposed the constitutional 
amendments of the 1990s and of 2001s and these were adopted by large majorities in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) of a highly fragmented and polarised 
legislature. This implied that despite their differences, Turkish parties came together in 
pursuit of EU membership. This scene changed in 2002 when the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) received two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly even 
though it got only 34 per cent of the vote, due to d’Hondt system of proportional 
representation and 10 percent electoral threshold. 
 Once in power, AKP did not have to negotiate with the major opposition parties 
to adopt constitutional amendments - including amendments related to reforms that were 
required for EU membership. It is important to note that when AKP, the ruling party with 
clear Islamic roots, became the proponent of Europeanization, this contradicted the 
opinion that Islamists disapprove of Western values. Kentmen (2008) states that the 
reason these groups become suddenly supporters of liberalism and democracy was 
because they saw freedom of thought and freedom of religion as a way to achieve their 
goals in the public sphere. 
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The Accession Partnership identified priority areas for Turkey’s membership 
preparations, one of which was to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus 
problem. Given the prospects of EU membership, AKP government denounced the hard 
line position towards the Cyprus issue and stopped supporting Rauf Denktas, nationalist 
leader of the Turkish Cypriots (Yilmaz 2011). After losing the Turkish government’s 
support, Denktas lost in presidential elections and then his party lost its parliamentary 
majority. The new government headed by Mehmet Ali Talat mobilized Turkish Cypriots 
to say “yes” to the plan for a solution to Cyprus problem. In April 2004, a referendum 
was held on a UN-sponsored unity plan known as the Annan Plan to reunite the country. 
While it was approved by 65 % of Turkish Cypriots, it was rejected by 76 % of Greek 
Cypriots. Nonetheless, the EU welcomed Cyprus to join that year and expected that this 
action would resolve the unresolved Cyprus problem eventually. In May 2004, the Greek 
Cypriot-controlled 'Republic of Cyprus' became a full member of the EU.  Jolly and 
Oktay (2012) describes the entry of Cyprus into Europe as one of the most dramatic 
episodes in Turkey-EU relations.   
A 2004 report by the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards 
accession concluded that Turkey had substantially progressed in its political reform 
process and would bring into force the further legislation.  As a result, the Commission 
recommended opening accession negotiations.  
“The political reforms are mainly contained in two major constitutional 
reforms in 2001 and 2004 and eight legislative packages adopted by 
Parliament between February 2002 and July 2004. Civil-military relations 
are evolving towards European standards. Important changes have been 
made to the judicial system, including the abolition of the State Security 
Courts. Public administration reform is underway. As regards human 
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rights, Turkey recognizes the primacy of international and European law. 
It has aligned itself to a large extent with international conventions and 
rulings, such as the complete abolition of the death penalty and the release 
of people sentenced for expressing non-violent opinion. Although some 
practical restrictions still exist, the scope of fundamental freedoms enjoyed 
by Turkish citizens, such as freedom of expression and assembly, has been 
substantially extended. Civil society has grown stronger. Cultural rights 
for the Kurds have started to be recognized. The state of emergency has 
been lifted everywhere; although the situation is still difficult, the process 
of normalisation has begun in the Southeast. Finally, on the enhanced 
political dialogue, Turkish foreign policy is contributing positively to 
regional stability.” (Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on Turkey’s progress towards accession, 
2004)   
 
It is important to note that two major issues, civil-military relations and cultural 
rights for Kurds, came to the forefront in the assessment of political criteria in this 
document.  Furthermore, the report states that it is an open-ended process whose outcome 
cannot be guaranteed beforehand and adds that Turkey should be connected to European 
structures, no matter what the outcome is.  
When a new wave of enlargement occurred in 2004 with the entrance of Central 
and Eastern European Countries, Malta and Cyprus, an additional protocol was signed to 
incorporate these countries into the EU-Turkish customs union (the "Ankara Protocol"). 
However, Turkey declared that she would continue non-recognition of 
the Republic of Cyprus and exclude Cyprus from the customs union. In 2006, in response 
to Turkey’s rejection to apply the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement for 
Cyprus, the Council decided that eight relevant chapters would not be opened and no 
chapter would be provisionally closed until Turkey had fulfilled its commitment. The 
eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to 
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Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, 
Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.  
As mentioned before, in the early 2000s the Turkish government undertook 
reform packages partly in response to EU pressures. In this regard, Turkey has 
similarities to Greece, Spain and Portugal as these countries tried to adopt basic 
principles and norms of liberal democracy during their candidacy so that they could be 
included in the European community. 
 These involved constitutional changes in issues such as the Turkish military’s 
role in politics, settlement of the Cyprus dispute, education in Kurdish language, 
improvement of minority rights, and abolition of the death penalty. The Turkish military 
had been seen as the defender of secularism and principles of Kemalism. When the 
reform process aimed at limiting the role of military in Turkish politics by abolishing the 
State Security Courts and increasing the number of civilian members in the National 
Security council, Turkey’s republican values were seen as under threat due to AKP and 
its policies. Furthermore, the abolition of the death penalty as an entry condition for 
Turkey despite the fact that Turkey did not carry out an execution since 1984 was seen as 
a way to save from execution the terrorist group Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan. Ocalan was captured and sentenced to death in 1999. Later, this 
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. AKP’s policies came under scrutiny by the 
opposition parties. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) blamed AKP as being submissive 
to EU demands.  As a result, by about 2005 the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
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Halk Partisi, CHP) changed its pro-EU stance and began claiming that AKP was 
exploiting the EU-related democratic reforms to put an end to the secular order. 
The Turkish government stopped promoting an EU agenda soon after Turkey 
began accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. Kalaycioglu (2011) argues that the 
government changed its focus from achievement of EU goals to consolidation of its 
power by trying to control the autonomous agencies of the state, from the Central Bank, 
Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) to the Council of Higher Education 
(YOK) and the rectors of the public universities. It is interesting to note that the 
government did not appoint a chief negotiator responsible for Turkey EU relations from 
2005 to 2009. Over the years, while some chapters have been opened, some chapters 
have been blocked by France and the Greek Cypriot administration. Since 2008    
accession negotiations have stood still. Turkey froze relations with the EU during the 
presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in 2012. Recently, the European Union promised to 
lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens in return for having illegal Turkish immigrants 
sent back to Turkey. In 2013, AKP government’s undemocratic response to peaceful 
protests that started with protecting Gezi Park in Istanbul, and that spread widely across 
the country, brought a complete halt to the negotiations between the EU and Turkey.  
When the European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the situation in Turkey 
(2013/2664 (RSP)) warned the Turkish government due to its harsh actions against the 
peaceful protesters, prime minister Erdogan declared that he did not recognize the 
resolution and criticized the EU.  According to Muftuler-Bac (2013) the Turkish 
government’s reaction shows that “the EU no longer possesses the political clout in 
Turkey it once enjoyed”. The recent events happening in Turkey under the AKP 
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government signal that Turkey is not moving forward on its path to consolidated liberal 
democracy.  Banning the social media, oppressing the media, and eroding the rule of law 
are only a few of the many repressive measures that have recently been taken under AKP 
government.   
As this brief historical overview has showed, over the years Turkey and EU 
relations came to a halt several times but then resumed.  Although accession negotiations 
are currently stalled, if the past is any predictor of the future, efforts to continue the 
relation are likely to occur since neither Turkey nor the EU wants a break up.  In future 
negotiations, as in the past, Turkish public opinion, not just elite opinion, will be crucial 
for the continuation of Turkey’s efforts to become an EU member. This dissertation 
therefore seeks to shed light on the factors that have shaped Turkish opinion on this issue 
in the past, and that are likely to influence such attitudes in the future. 
Dissertation Plan 
The chapters that follow will provide more information about the context for 
understanding how to evaluate attitudes towards the EU, and will ask whether models 
developed in other contexts help to understand how Turkish citizens think about the EU.  
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature and forms the theoretical framework for 
the dissertation. This research will examine three major explanations of public support 
for EU integration: the role of economic considerations (Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993 
Gabel 1998), domestic political considerations (Anderson 1998) and identity factors 
(Hooghe, and Marks 2004; McLaren 2002). In brief, economic factors include 
evaluations about national economic situation and personal economic situation and also 
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the effect human capital, political factors are identified as three proxies from domestic 
political context which are government, system and party support, and identity factors are 
represented by the effect of fear of cultural loss and pride in nationality. The first section 
looks at the theories that were developed to understand determinants of support for EU 
integration in the old member states and that were later applied or adapted to study 
attitudes in previous candidate countries. Then, I discuss the literature on Turkish public 
opinion. Finally, I introduce the hypotheses that will be tested in the following chapters. 
Chapter 3 provides a first test of these hypotheses using data from twelve years' 
worth of Eurobarometer data. After presenting the results of tests of the hypotheses 
formulated in Chapter 2, I evaluate the results by using simulation. 
Chapter 4 complements the analysis of Chapter 3 by examining the link between 
different party constituents and EU support.  Because the Eurobarometer polls do not 
contain information about Turkish respondents' partisan preferences, this chapter uses 
longitudinal data from Transatlantic Trends Surveys to answer questions about the role of 
domestic politics in shaping attitudes towards the EU.  
The last chapter provides the conclusions I reached and the results’ implications 
for research and for policy makers. I will also mention constraints of the research and 
provide recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 – 
Theories Revisited: the Case of Turkey 
 
This chapter will explore the literature on public support for EU integration and 
form the theoretical framework to understand the Turkish case. First, I will focus on the 
main theories that were developed to understand determinants of support in Western 
Europe. Second, I will present an overview of studies that explain support for EU 
membership in candidate countries. Third, I will refer to the Turkish public opinion 
literature on the EU and provide my theoretical argument for the Turkish case.  Next, 
drawing implications from the previous work, I formulate my hypotheses that will be 
empirically tested in the following chapter. 
In the first wave of studies in this area, scholars (Anderson 1998; Brinegar, and 
Jolly 2005; Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998; Gabel, and Whitten 1997; 
Hooghe, and Marks 2004; Inglehart 1970; Janssen 1991; McLaren 2002) studied attitudes 
towards the EU in Western Europe. When a new wave of enlargement took place, the 
geographical focus of studies shifted from Western Europe to Southern Europe and then 
to Central and Eastern Europe (Cichowski 2000; Herzog, and Tucker 2009; Elgun, and 
Tillman 2007; Rohrschneider, and Whitefield 2006; Slomczynski and Shabad 2003; 
Thomas 2005; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Tverdova and Anderson 2004). 
What has driven the evolution of theories of support for the EU? Loveless and 
Rohrschneider (2008) state that our understanding of public opinion towards the EU has 
been driven by the considerations by which the EU itself has progressed. The “European 
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Union has developed on the basis of a commitment to a set of broad economic and 
political normative ideals: economically, this means support for liberal markets, which 
includes migration of workers and of capital; politically, the EU implies transferring 
sovereignty to a supranational government via new legislative, executive and judicial 
institutions” (Rohrschneider, and Whitefield 2006, 144). Furthermore, the authors refer to 
expectations that depend on the outcomes in both the political and economic areas since 
improvement in economic performance and social welfare is the promise of single 
economic market while improvement of quality of governance is the promise of EU 
political arrangements. Accordingly, support for the EU should be linked to attitudes 
towards these political and economic ideals and expectations.   
De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko (2008) summarize developments in the 
field by stating that the focus on hard economic and utilitarian predictors in explaining 
public attitudes towards the EU changed into an emphasis on soft predictors such as 
feelings of identity and attitudes towards immigrants.  
The theories that have been formulated to understand the attitudes towards the EU 
in Western Europe were later adopted to understand determinants of public opinion in 
candidate countries.  When testing whether previous theories are applicable to the new 
cases, scholars underlined that theories should take into account the particular context of 
these countries. They considered what the meaning of the EU was for citizens in their 
studies. In Greece, Spain and Portugal, EU membership was the goal to be achieved in 
order to strengthen democratic institutions and consolidate democracies. In Central and 
Eastern European countries, EU membership was regarded as an assurance that economic 
15 
 
and political reforms will be carried on. In those cases, citizens incorporate their views 
about domestic political and economic reforms when forming their opinion about the 
European Union. “If the EU serves as a symbol for democracy and the rule of free 
markets, people who share values consistent with the Western model and who see their 
country’s future as tied to countries in the West are likely to be supportive of EU 
membership” (Tverdova, and Anderson 2004, 190).  
Furthermore, time is an important factor that affects the nature of public opinion 
in different ways (Loveless, and Rohrschneider 2008). Since member states were 
politically and economically connected to the EU earlier than candidate countries, 
citizens in member countries have more experience and knowledge related to the EU. 
Therefore, they might depend on their experience and knowledge about the EU when 
forming their opinion. If accession negotiations in applicant countries are advanced, 
media and political elites start to focus on the EU and discuss the benefits versus 
disadvantages of membership. Opinions also change during candidacy. When candidate 
countries become members, their main concerns change. For instance, concerns over 
economic affluence came to the forefront and replaced the concerns about the 
continuance of reforms undertaken during the process of transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
Over time, studies of support for integration started to employ hierarchical models 
that can enable the researchers to take into account other factors at different levels such 
as domestic economic and political conditions. Previous studies had used country 
dummies as controls.  
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After presenting this brief chronological overview of the development of studies 
in this field, it is time to turn to a more thematic exploration of the literature.  For 
purposes of the theoretical framework developed in this research, it is useful to divide the 
main explanatory factors identified by previous studies into three major subgroups: 
economic considerations, domestic political considerations, and identity. 
Economic Considerations 
The historical roots of the EU lie in the Treaty of Rome that created the European 
Economic Community. The EEC as an economic organization aimed at promoting 
affluence and economic efficiency. Accordingly, the economic voting model has been 
applied by scholars to study the impact of economic conditions on support for the EU and 
integration process. This perspective identifies evaluations about the national economy 
and personal economic situation, and calculation of costs and benefits, as the main factors 
that influence citizen support for European integration (Anderson, and Kalthenthaler 
1996; Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998).  At first, scholars employed a macro-
level approach to examine the effect of the economy on attitudes. They argued that the 
economic performance of member states measured in terms of GDP growth, 
unemployment, inflation, level of trade with other EU countries and net national returns 
from the EU will have an influence when people are forming their attitudes towards the 
EU. However, they were not able to present empirical evidence consistent with their 
models. The problems associated with using macro level measures to understand micro 
level phenomena led scholars to employ measures of individual perceptions of personal 
economic situation and national economic performance (Gabel, and Whitten 1997).  
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Scholars (Duch, and Stevenson 2008) argued that extending the economic voting model 
to study EU support was problematic; they described this practice as theory drift. 
According to Duch and Stevenson, the effect of membership on national economic 
policies has been indirect. They doubt that the average citizen has the sophistication and 
knowledge to recognize this linkage. Up until now, evaluations of national and personal 
economic condition have been utilized by scholars to study support for EU integration.  
Over time, the increase in the information sources and more political debates and media 
coverage might have made this linkage clearer for the average citizen. 
Gabel (1998) argued that market liberalization has a different impact on different 
regions and parts of the population. For instance, regions that are close to borders with 
other EU members will benefit more due to growing economic relations.  Individuals’ 
gains will depend on their personal economic competitiveness. Because of this, human 
capital (measured as education, and occupation) and economic resources determine 
whether a person can adapt successfully to the changing conditions (Anderson, and 
Reichert 1996 cited in Gabel 1998; Gabel, and Palmer 1995). Accordingly, it is expected 
that the people who are in the high socioeconomic stratum will assess the EU more 
positively than the people who are in the low socioeconomic stratum since they have the 
characteristics that help them make the most of benefits from the market liberalization.  
These authors (Gabel and Palmer 1994; Gabel 1998; Tverdova Anderson 2004) 
hypothesize that high education and high income levels have positive significant effect on 
support for EU membership.  In a longitudinal study of 12 EU member states, 
Hakhverdian et al. (2013) specifically explore the relation between educational 
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attainment and Euroscepticism. While the authors find support for the negative relation 
between educational attainment and Euroscepticism, they underline that the effect of 
education becomes stronger over time. 
Furthermore, occupational characteristics come to the forefront in these economic 
models. Since skill levels have an impact on competitiveness, it is expected that skilled 
and unskilled workers will have different evaluations of the EU.  Low skilled workers 
will be more skeptical of EU membership while professionals and executives will be 
positive towards EU membership. Farmers and fishermen are expected to evaluate 
membership more positively because they are paid subsidies resulting from the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy.  
In contrast to the argument that lower-skilled workers will be less competitive in 
an integrated market and are therefore less likely to support EU integration, Jolly and 
Brinegar (2005, 156) argue that this might not hold true because the “competitive 
advantage of lower skilled workers on the international labor market is unlikely to be 
fixed across countries, labor conditions and employment opportunities vary substantially 
across the EU”. These authors state that failure to take into account national contextual 
factors will provide an incomplete picture and lead to biased conclusions. 
When studying attitudes toward EU membership in post-communist countries, 
Tucker et al. (2002) present a revised look at the utilitarian approach of Western 
experience. They state that citizens do not think about how EU membership will change 
their economic position in the future, as the utilitarian approach posits. Instead, they look 
at how their economic position has changed since the transition from communism. 
19 
 
According to the authors, one’s status in the wake of the transition determines the 
attitudes towards EU integration. Hence, two groups are identified: “winners” who have 
benefited from the transition are more likely to support EU membership for their country 
than “losers” who have been hurt by the transition (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002, 
557). Furthermore, as membership means participating in a free market, it is expected 
that supporters of the free market will be more likely to support EU membership than 
those who oppose the free market. The authors use individuals’ self-assessments of their 
economic progress during the transition in order to assess winners and losers.  
Elgun and Tillman (2007) also suggest a revision of utilitarian theory for studying 
EU candidate countries. The authors argue that the effect of economic factors is 
conditional upon exposure to the distributive consequences of EU membership. If citizens 
do not have much experience with the economic consequences of integration, then human 
capital (educational attainment, occupational status and income) becomes irrelevant in 
the formation of EU attitudes. However, this changes when accession negotiations are 
advanced and the respondent’s country’s accession is in the foreseeable future. While 
there is strong evidence for the human capital hypothesis in Western Europe, this is not 
true for the case of Baltic studies (Ehin, 2001 cited in Elgun and Tillman 2007, 393). A 
later study re-examined the winner-loser gap in attitudes towards EU membership. It is 
argued that the size of the gap increases when EU membership becomes credible: “as EU 
membership becomes more likely and more proximate, it will become increasingly 
apparent that membership actually represents more than just an entrance to the “West” 
and will imply a guarantee of new economic realities. That in turn ought to lead the gap 
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in support between economic winners and losers for EU membership to increase” 
(Herzog, and Tucker 2009, 8) 
Domestic Political Considerations 
In contrast to the economic approaches, proxy theories view EU attitudes as a 
reflection of attitudes towards domestic politics.  This perspective can be traced back to 
Inglehart’s (1970) argument that cognitive mobilization helps one to relate to remote 
roles and situations. According to Inglehart, since European institutions represent 
something distant, understanding them requires a high level of cognitive mobilization. 
Subsequently, Jannsen (1991, 467) states that “the issue of integration is too difficult, too 
abstract or not interesting for an average citizen to form well thought attitudes”. He 
claimed that local politics is easier to understand than national politics because it is not 
distant. Likewise, national politics is much easier to understand than the EU, which is a 
supranational entity. Anderson (1998) argues that empirical evidence supports the 
argument that the public is typically uninformed about the EU. Because of this, it is 
unrealistic to expect mass publics to show egocentric rationality when the issue is 
economic benefits to be obtained from EU integration.  He argues that citizens need 
heuristics to compensate for the lack of information. Therefore, they rely on domestic 
cues when forming their opinions, cues which may come from political institutions, 
governments and parties. After all, governments of member states participate in EU 
activities and decision making. The negotiation process is handled by the incumbent 
government in the candidate countries. Mass media informs the public about the meetings 
of ministers and heads of government that come together for EU related work. Therefore, 
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citizens incorporate their opinion of the incumbent government when forming their 
opinion about the EU.  
Following Anderson’s lead, scholars (Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Karp, 
Banducci, and Bowler 2003) took into account the role of evaluation of national politics 
and institutions in understanding EU support. Following earlier arguments about the 
impact of cognitive mobilization, they also incorporated knowledge levels into their 
study. Karp, Banducci, and Bowler (2003, 276) state that if people gain more knowledge 
of the EU, their evaluations of the EU will be rooted in EU institutions rather than 
national institutions. The authors find that evaluations of EU performance are more likely 
to reflect the performance of the national government among low knowledge citizens.  
When studying the rising skepticism in EU after the economic crisis of 2007, 
Armingeon and Ceka (2014) find that the effect of national evaluations becomes less 
visible for those sophisticated Europeans who are more knowledgeable about the EU. 
People with a high level of political knowledge do not depend on the national context to 
form their opinion.  
Importantly, even if proxy effects exist, they may not be uniform in all countries. 
Thus, Tanasouiu and Colonescu’s (2008) case study of Bulgaria also show that 
individuals use domestic cues to evaluate the EU. But in contrast to previous studies, they 
found that respondents who are dissatisfied with their political leaders’ performance tend 
to be more in favor of EU integration.  The authors posit that Bulgarian citizens think that 
EU membership will put the house in order and correct the government wrongdoing. 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) argue that people are more likely to support EU integration in 
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countries that have high levels of corruption and have less developed welfare systems. 
The reason is that “the worse the opinion of the national political system, the lower the 
opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to Europe” (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000, 147). 
Identity 
In addition to economic and domestic political considerations, other factors have 
been said to shape variation in public support for the EU. These include the “soft 
predictors” conceptualized by De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko (2008): identity 
considerations, fears of symbolic threats to the national community, and anti-immigration 
sentiments (Hooghe, and Marks 2004; McLaren 2002, 2004)  
The European citizenship concept was first introduced with the Maastricht treaty 
of 1991 that created the European Union, moving the organization beyond economic 
objectives toward political ambitions. Hooghe and Marks (2004) point out that the 
European Union connects national and European governments through multilevel 
governance which pools sovereignty over important aspects of citizens’ lives. The “EU is 
a supranational polity with extensive authority over those living in its territory” (Hooghe, 
and Marks 2004, 4). In regards to European integration and development of European 
identity, people feel that their national identity is threatened. Accession negotiations 
require candidate states to carry out reforms to meet the acquis communautaire. The EU 
reform process clearly has significant consequences for national sovereignty. Because of 
this, European identity can be seen as an emerging threat to national identity in the EU 
candidate states. In line with this, Hooghe and Marks (2004) differentiate between 
exclusive and inclusive identities. The authors posit that individuals with national identity 
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that is exclusive of other territorial identities will show less support for EU integration 
than the ones who conceive of their national identity in inclusive terms. The authors state 
that exclusive identity can easily be mobilized against EU integration by political parties 
and elites if there is polarization, and if radical right parties are strong. 
McLaren (2004) investigates the link between fear of loss of national identity and 
levels of support for the European integration. She finds that although such fears do have 
an impact on support for the EU, the impact is not very strong. De Vreese, Boomgaarden, 
and Semetko (2008) states that people have a tendency to make in-group versus out-
group distinctions that are advantageous for their in-group and unfavorable for the out-
group. Similar to this argument, Elgun and Tillman (2007) use a variable that measures 
attitudes toward outside social groups and utilize a questions that ask whether people are 
disturbed by presence of people of another (1) nationality; (2) race; (3) religion disturbing 
in your daily life. The authors find that the effect of this variable is substantively large. 
Literature on Turkish Public Opinion 
After providing a survey of relevant literature in member states and in Central 
European candidates, it is time to look specifically at how public attitudes toward the EU 
have been studied in the Turkish context. At first the EU project was seen as an elite 
project in Turkey (Muftuler-Bac 2005). Consequently, scholars of Turkish politics who 
were interested in the EU studied Turkish parliamentarians’ attitudes rather than public 
attitudes (Aksit et al. 2011; McLaren 2000; McLaren, and Bac 2003). After the prospect 
of Turkey’s membership became the most contentious debate topic among the public and 
political elite in Europe, scholars (Lauren 2007; De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 
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2008) began examining the determinants of European public opinion on Turkey’s EU 
accession. Nevertheless, despite the importance of the issue, and despite the availability 
of good public opinion data since at least 2001, empirical studies of Turkish public 
opinion were slow to appear. Only in recent years have we seen the emergence of studies 
that focus on Turkish attitudes toward the EU (Arikan 2012; Carkoglu 2003; Carkoglu, 
and Kentmen 2011; Jolly, and Oktay 2012; Kentmen 2008; Senyuva 2006; Yilmaz 2011).  
These studies took into account the history of Turkey-EU relations and characteristics of 
Turkey while examining the validity of models in the literature.  Yet while this new 
empirical focus represented a step forward, their cumulative results lacked clarity, in part 
because studies used different datasets, different variables, and different time points, and 
thus produced different results.   
Some scholars (Carkoglu 2003; Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011; Kentmen 2008) 
have focused on religion, asking whether it is the main source of Euroscepticism in the 
Turkish scene.  The findings from these studies are contradictory. Kentmen finds that 
one’s devotion to Islam does not affect attitudes toward the West. In a later study, 
Kentmen and Carkoglu (2011) support the previous finding that the religious practice 
variable is not significant. However, the authors raise the question of whether results 
would change if they used multi-dimensional representation of religiosity, as Carkoglu 
(2003) previously used.   
Testing the human capital hypothesis, scholars (Elgun, and Tillman 2007; 
Kentmen 2008) find that occupation alone does not affect public support.  Drawing on 
Jolly and Brinegar’s argument about cross country differences in competitive advantage 
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of lower skilled workers, Kentmen and Carkoglu (2011) argue that the expectations of 
labor in Turkey will be different because Turkey is a labor abundant country when 
compared to Western European countries. Kentmen (2008) finds that unskilled workers 
support EU integration when they perceive that it will bring benefits to Turkey’s 
economy (2008, 504). According to Kentmen’s study, the opportunities for free 
movement labor do not play a role in opinion formation. However, unskilled workers 
incorporate their views about the situation of national economy when answering 
questions about the EU. 
Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) raise the question of whether Turks will relate 
evaluations of national economic conditions to the EU’s impact on the national economy. 
Turkey has been a Customs Union member since 1995. The authors argue that neither the 
Customs Union nor the loans received since the Association agreement was signed in 
1963 made a significant impact on macroeconomic indicators, in contrast to the 
experience in other candidate countries. As a result, Carkoglu and Kentmen expect that 
the effect of national evaluations on EU support might be different than in other 
candidate countries. However, it is possible that people might think that the adoption of 
EU reforms brings stability and economic growth. Furthermore, Carkoglu and Kentmen 
(2011) draw attention to the change in the role of economic evaluations. People who 
expressed positive evaluations of the economy were more likely to be supportive of 
membership in 2001-2002, whereas in 2009 they were less likely to be supportive of 
membership.  It is possible that the Turkish economic crisis of 2001 led people see EU 
reforms as a source of stability, and therefore of prosperity. In later years, this enthusiasm 
disappears when Turkey experienced a high growth rate of gross domestic product at the 
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same time that the Eurozone crisis occurred. Jolly and Oktay argue that Turkish 
economic growth in recent years has contributed to the decreasing levels of public 
support for EU membership. In their study, Jolly and Oktay (2012, 9) hypothesize that as 
the Turkish economy improves relative to the EU economy, respondents will be less 
supportive. 
Furthermore, authors (Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011, 376) draw attention to the 
reform process which involved democratization efforts to increase minority rights for 
Kurds. This led to rising partisan cleavages around EU issues coupled with rising 
nationalist sentiment.  As a result, support for the EU declined. 
Yilmaz (2011) argues that some of the characteristics of scepticism in Turkey 
resemble the case of Eastern Europe, where identity Euroscepticism was evident. The 
issues were not about sharing power with Brussels, “but symbolic ones, such as anthem 
and flag, that they saw heard and touched in their display Eurosceptic tendencies over the 
issue of sovereignty” Yilmaz (2011, 15).  In the Turkish case, sources of identity 
Euroscepticism include: fear for loss of national sovereignty, morality, negative 
discrimination and the Sevres Syndrome. Yilmaz explains that the latter refers to the 
belief that European states wants to weaken Turkey by supporting ethnic separatism.  In a 
nutshell, the term comes from Treaty of Sevres that involved partitioning of the Ottoman 
Empire, something that was never realized due to Turkish War of Independence. In a 
recent study, Arikan (2012) stresses that since most of the accession debate revolves 
around national identity, variables that measure group interests have high explanatory 
power. The authors (de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008; McLaren 2007) who 
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study European public attitudes toward Turkish membership find that reluctance towards 
further integration is a function of hostility toward and fear of Turkish culture and fear of 
immigration.  While exploring the other side of the coin which is Turkish public attitudes 
towards EU, scholars (Arikan 2012; Jolly and Oktay 2012) examine whether the idea of 
losing cultural identity plays an important role in the formation of public opinion on EU. 
A different explanation is offered by Jolly and Oktay (2012, 7) one which takes 
into account changes in Turkish foreign policy and European Turcoscepticism. The 
authors argue that both a shift of regional attention in Turkish foreign policy from Europe 
towards Turkey’s neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa, and EU citizens’ 
unwelcoming attitude,  have an influence on how Turks feel toward the EU. Carkoglu 
and Kentmen (2011) found that satisfaction with democracy is positively linked to 
support for EU membership. Scholars previously talked about the influence of European 
attitudes towards Turkey’s possible accession, especially the negative approaches of 
European leadership cadres (Yilmaz 2008; Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011).  However, 
they have not incorporated this into their models up until recently (see Jolly and Oktay, 
2012). 
In short, while past studies of Turkish public opinion have found support for most 
of the factors previously linked with attitudes towards EU, there were also findings 
against the expectations. However, puzzles remain since many studies either focus on a 
short period of time or use pooled data. We do not know how the effects of variables 
change over time. Most importantly, do some variables become significant for some 
years and become insignificant for some years, and for those variables that are 
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consistently significant over time, are the signs of the coefficient the same for all years? 
By addressing these questions, this study will take a comprehensive look at the dynamics 
of Turkish public opinion. 
Understanding Evolving Attitudes 
In order to fully understand determinants of Turkish public support for the EU, I 
argue that while building on public opinion literature, we need to take into account the 
context within which perceptions are shaped.  In other words, I agree with authors such 
as Jolly and Oktay and Yilmaz that we need to understand the context of Turkish politics 
and economics in order to understand these attitudes. Furthermore, I argue that we need 
to see this context as a dynamic environment, not a static one. Because of this dynamic 
quality, it is not only the value of the variables in the model that may change. Instead, the 
model itself may change, with some variables being more important in one era than in 
another.  Longitudinal study will enable us to investigate the effect of each variable on 
support for EU membership for each year, and to ask whether there are indeed shifts over 
time.  
The Changing Contexts: External and Internal Influences 
Turkey’s experience of accession negotiations has been much different than that 
experienced by most recent candidate countries (with the possible exception of Croatia). 
In the Turkish case, the open-ended negotiation process has meant that the future of the 
process cannot be guaranteed. Because prospects of membership are so uncertain, the 
accession negotiations have essentially demanded concessions from Turkey without 
giving any assurances of membership. Eralp (2009) defines the negotiating framework 
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for Turkey as stricter conditions and fewer incentives. This process entails 
implementation of reforms in sensitive issues to meet the Copenhagen criteria. These 
areas are: EU’s political accession conditionality and Turkey’s recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus, improvement of minority rights for Kurds, and the curtailment of the 
military’s role in Turkish politics.  
The Cyprus problem, the unresolved dispute between the Turkish Cypriot and 
Greek-Cypriot communities of the island of Cyprus, came to the forefront during 
Turkey’s accession negotiations. Yilmaz (2011, 9) describes the situation as a serious 
obstacle towards Turkey’s membership. The Republic of Cyprus, which had said “No” to 
the Annan plan, became a member of the EU and now has veto power that it can exercise 
over Turkey’s accession. Due to custom union obligations, Turkey was required to open 
its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot planes and vessels. When Turkey rejected this 
requirement, the EU Council decided to close eight chapters until Turkey fulfills its 
commitment related to the Additional Protocol. 
The Incumbent AKP 
AKP came to power in 2002 and has since won the next two elections. Since 
2002, AKP has been in charge of the EU negotiation process. AKP originated from the 
remnants of the Virtue party (FP), an Islamist political party that sees an unresolvable 
conflict between Islamic values and Western’s values. However, AKP describes itself as 
a conservative democracy mass party that situates itself at the center of political 
spectrum. Despite this background, and to many people's surprise, when AKP came to 
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power, it became an enthusiastic proponent of EU reforms. The infamous remarks of 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan hint at the underlying intentions behind the democratization goals. 
“Democracy is a means to an end, not the end itself. Democracy is like a 
train. We shall get out when we arrive at the station we want.” (Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan Interview with Nilgun Cerrahoglu, Milliyet newspaper, 
14 July 1996) 
 
No doubt, cooperation between EU and AKP government to decrease the powers of 
military in Turkish politics raised concerns among the constituents that are not supporters 
of AKP; this, in turn, has led to a decrease in EU support. It is necessary to mention 
Ergenekon trial which started in 2008 when journalists and military officers were accused 
with preparing coup d’Etat against AKP government. The trial was criticized by EU on 
the grounds that it is being unfair. It was perceived as AKP was trying to contain any 
opposition. Only when the prime minister and some of the members of his government 
found themselves in the midst of corruption allegations, Erdogan mentioned that 
Ergenekon trial was due to the existence of parallel state that planned the entire plot 
against the military officers and journalists who were defenders of secularism. Yilmaz 
(2011) draws attention to the decline in support among Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
supporters. At the party level, Celep (2011) argues that the CHP’s Euroscepticism results 
from the party’s distrust of the AKP government’s honesty and ability to implement the 
reforms. Muftuler-Bac (2005) states that opposition to the democratization efforts comes 
from the secular, Kemalist elite as they believe that these reforms will lead to divisive 
cleavages of Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism.  
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Economic Growth in Turkey and Economic Crisis in Europe 
The changing economic situation both in EU countries and in Turkey also may 
have shown an impact on Turkish attitudes. Following the economic crisis and the IMF 
austerity policies, there was a decline in support for the EU member states. The recent 
great recession in Europe has led to an increase in the number of people who are 
discontent with policies at both the national and the supranational level. In 2012 large 
anti-austerity demonstrations took place in Athens, Lisbon and Madrid. When the EU 
was struggling with its own financial problems, the debt crisis in Greece and in Cyprus 
was covered by Turkish media. While Europe was experiencing recession, the Turkish 
economy was performing well. In light of this reversal of economic fortunes, the Turkish 
political elite did not miss the opportunity to state that the EU needs Turkey more than 
Turkey needs the EU. Furthermore, the Turkish government utilized the rhetoric of 
economic stability frequently to counter-attack against the political criticisms it received. 
Hence, all these developments might make EU less attractive in terms of its economic 
advantages in the eyes of the public. I expect that public watching the news on European 
economic crisis encountered with economic growth framing at home will show less 
enthusiasm towards EU. Thus, in the first decade of the twenty-first century the context 
of Turkey’s EU application changed radically, both in terms of how this issue was treated 
by domestic political actors, and in terms of the broader economic context in which the 
negotiations were occurring.  These shifting contextual variables are notable, because 
they tell researchers that our models are not static. Because of these changes, focusing on 
the variables through time might provide a better understanding of the impact of 
individual variables. 
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Hypotheses: Explaining Turkish Public Opinion Support for EU 
After having presented the theoretical framework in the previous section, now it is 
time to introduce the hypotheses that will be tested in the following chapter. Because the 
Utilitarian perspective has multiple dimensions, it generates four primary hypotheses. As 
an extension of the traditional economic voting model, I hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 1:  Respondents who expect that the economy will do better in the 
coming years will be more supportive of the EU. 
Hypothesis 2: Respondents who expect that their personal economic situation will 
improve in the coming years will be more supportive of the EU. 
One aspect of the economic perspective is the insight that individual resources 
mediate the impact of macro-economic conditions of perceptions of the EU.  Thus, the 
human capital hypothesis says that higher status occupations, educational attainment or 
levels of income provide opportunities for individuals to deal with the changes introduced 
by liberalized labor market.  
Hypothesis 3:  Respondents with a higher level of education will more supportive 
of the EU. 
In formulating the human capital hypothesis, I take into account Seth and 
Brinegar’s argument that people’s expectations about the impact of EU integration are 
affected not only by the level of their own skills but also by the skill endowment of that 
country.  Since Turkey is a low skilled country compared to the EU average (Kentmen 
2008), I hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 4: Manual laborers will be supportive of the EU. 
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Hypothesis 5: Professional workers will be less supportive of the EU. 
Most models of public support for integration include variables related to 
domestic cues (government, party and system support). Such models assume that people 
rely on domestic cues due to lack of information when formulating opinion about the EU. 
It is plausible to assume that people have less information about the EU in candidate 
countries than in member states. In that case, we expect that domestic cues should play an 
important role in determining support for EU. I will phrase the hypothesis in line with 
this statement by Elgun and Tillman (2007, 393) that “since national governments are 
responsible for negotiating the accession treaty, a citizen who views domestic political 
processes favorably should be more likely to trust the government to manage this process 
well.”  
Hypothesis 6: If the respondent expresses trust in national government, she/he 
will be more supportive of the EU. 
Another proxy is evaluation of national democratic performance. Following Anderson 
(1998), I will utilize the question about satisfaction with democracy in Turkey as a 
measure for system support. Unfortunately, this question is not asked in all the surveys. 
Therefore, I will not be able to incorporate in the baseline model for all years. However, I 
will test the hypothesis for the years the question is available. 
Hypothesis 7: The more satisfied the respondent with how democracy works in the 
country, the more likely she/he will be supportive of the EU. 
The third part of proxy hypothesis is party support. Due to their vote and seat shares, I 
will be focusing on three parties. Due to data availability, I will be testing this hypothesis 
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in Chapter 4. Anderson states that traditional categories of partisanship such as left/right 
cleavage do not perform well when tested for relation with support for EU.  Instead, 
Anderson opts for another dimension which is establishment/new parties where he argues 
that supporters of antiestablishment parties are less supportive EU project.  Taggart and 
Sczerbiak (2004, 5) argue that “parties that are parties of government or potential parties 
of government – have high costs associated with expressing any sort of Euroscepticism as 
it will be these parties that will be directly engaged in negotiating the accession process 
and because the general consensus around the benefits of EU accession are most strongly 
represented at the ideological heart of a country’s party system”. Following the idea that 
party position is related to level of the Euroscepticism a party adopts, I will take into 
account whether the party is in the government or in the opposition.  
Hypothesis 8: AKP voters will be more likely to support EU membership after 
their party came to power. 
Hypothesis 9: CHP voters will be less likely to support EU membership after AKP 
came to power and their party is in opposition.  
Hypothesis 10: MHP voters will be less likely to support EU membership after 
AKP came to power and their party is in opposition 
Previously, scholars who studied European public opinion and Turkey’s accession have 
identified the fear of weakening of national cultural traditions as another explanation for 
Euroscepticism.  This leads to the social identity hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 11:  Respondents who relate the EU with loss of cultural identity will 
be less supportive of the EU. 
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Another question that I used to measure the effect of national identity on the formation of 
attitudes asks the respondent how proud he/she is about being Turkish.  Similar to the 
question about satisfaction with democracy, this question is also not available for all 
years. Still, I will look at its effect for the years the question is asked. 
Hypothesis 12: The more proud the respondent is about her/his nationality, the 
less supportive she/he will be of the EU. 
Scholars (Christin 2005; Tverdova and Anderson 2004) underline that the EU 
represents democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of free markets for the 
people in Central and Eastern countries and formulate their hypotheses based on the idea 
that if people are positive about these factors, they will be supportive of the EU also.  
Because Turkey is still a candidate country with membership not seen in the foreseeable 
future, people might give importance to the factors that EU stands for while forming their 
opinion about membership. Therefore, it is worth looking at the effect of these items on 
support for the EU.   
Hypothesis 13: Respondents who relate the EU to economic prosperity will be 
supportive of the EU. 
Hypothesis 14: Respondents who relate the EU to democracy will be supportive of 
the EU. 
Hypothesis 15: Respondents who relate the EU to freedom of movement will be 
supportive of the EU. 
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It would be interesting to see the substantive effect of these variables since this can 
provide information about the priorities among these three for Turkish people. Scholars 
(Inglehart 1970, Jannsen 1991) identify the EU as something abstract in nature for the 
average citizen. If European integration is a remote political event, then a high level of 
cognitive mobilization is required so that one can receive and process messages coming 
from this distant object. Inglehart  (1970, 48) explains his hypothesis in this way: “if the 
content of the messages concerning Europe were pre-dominantly negative, we would then 
expect the more educated groups to be more strongly opposed to integration than the less 
educated. In fact, our impression is that the reverse has been true. Over the last two 
decades, the topic of European integration has received predominantly favorable 
coverage in the mass media and schools of Western Europe. National opinion leaders, 
moreover, (with certain prominent exceptions) have been relatively strong supporters of 
European integration. Hence, we expect that the more educated groups among the public 
would not only be more likely to have an opinion concerning European integration; they 
would also be more likely to have a favorable orientation toward it”. Despite the 
empirical support for the relation between knowledge and attitudes toward EU (Karp, 
Banducci, and Bowler 2003; Tillman 2007) studies on Turkish public opinion have not 
yet included knowledge factor in their models. In this research, I also incorporated 
information effect to the model. Results with respect to the hypothesized relationships are 
robust when I add political knowledge variable.    
Studying the Dynamics of Turkish Public Opinion 
This chapter formed the theoretical background for my case study and formulated 
hypotheses. In order to offer a comprehensive picture of Turkish Public opinion towards 
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the EU, I included many hypotheses to be tested in the following chapter.  The following 
two chapters will test these hypotheses using longitudinal data to see whether changing 
circumstances change the factors that influence opinion in this area.  The basic approach 
is to construct a baseline model and to observe change over a politically crucial decade in 
the variables that affect the results. However, the baseline model will not include many 
variables due to differences in data availability for each year in the study.  Because I 
believe it is still worthwhile to look at the effect of variables even if it is only for some 
years, I will also construct some models using key variables for which less data is 
available. 
 Since I will be examining the effect of the variables on EU support over time, I 
expect that the magnitude of the effect of variables will vary over time. As explained 
above, it is also possible that the sign of the coefficients might vary due to changes in 
contextual factors.  This longitudinal approach should show us whether Turkish attitudes 
towards the EU have followed patterns similar to those in other candidate countries 
despite big differences in the Turkish accession negotiations.  It also should reveal 
whether domestic political factors or economic conditions have played a bigger role in 
cooling popular enthusiasm for EU membership.  
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CHAPTER 3 – 
Analysis of Determinants of Turkish Public Support for the EU 
 
 
 
This chapter will introduce the dataset, the operationalization of the variables and 
the methods to study the question. It will be followed by analysis seeking to answer to 
what degree existing theories explain the Turkish case. After presenting the results of 
tests of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2, I will provide the interpretation of results 
by using simulations. 
Introducing the Data 
The data used for the following analysis is from Eurobarometer (EB) Surveys 
conducted between the years 2002-2012. These surveys include Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer (CCEB) from 2002-2003, and regular Eurobarometer surveys 
thereafter.
1
The EB survey is conducted twice a year. If questions of interest are available 
in both waves, both surveys are included for that year.  
Each survey is composed of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per 
country. The advantage of using EB surveys is that it provides the researcher the 
opportunity to compare the Turkish case to other studies in the literature. The available 
                                                 
1
 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer  (CCEB) 2002.2, September-October 2002;  CCEB 2003.4, October-
November 2003; EB 62, October-November 2004; EB 64.2, October-November 2005; EB 65.2, March-
May 2006;  EB 67.2, April-May 2007;  EB 69.2, March-May 2008;  EB 70.1, October-November 2008; EB 
71.3,  June-July 2009;  EB 72.4,  October-November 2009; EB 73.4, May 2010; EB 74.2, November-
December 2010; EB 75.3, May 2011;  EB 78. 1, November 2012. 
39 
 
questions and control variables are thus identical.  Moreover, these questions have been 
asked with great regularity. In an ideal world, one would use panel data to study changing 
patterns of Turkish support towards EU, but panel data on this topic is not available for 
Turkey.  Using EB data makes it possible to focus on a time span of 10 years rather than 
one time point, thus giving leverage to investigate public opinion trends in Turkey.  
One of the drawbacks when using surveys that encompass a long period of time is 
the need to work with questions that are continuously available.  This dictates against 
using questions that are asked in only one or a few of the years. Unfortunately, this 
includes some questions that would have been of interest, such as satisfaction with 
democracy or the question about national pride.  
Another major limitation with the EB surveys is that they do not regularly ask a 
question related to party preference.   Given the theories about EU attitudes as a proxy for 
attitudes to domestic politics, it would be interesting to look at the effect of party support 
on attitudes towards EU. However, the question about vote choice “if there was a general 
election tomorrow, which party would you vote?” is only asked in CCEB surveys (the 
earliest surveys in the set). This does not let us observe the changes in attitudes of 
different party supporters towards EU.  In the next chapter I will turn to another data 
source to investigate the partisan political aspects of attitudes towards the EU.  In the 
current chapter, however, partisan preferences will be excluded because of lack of 
information about this in the EB. 
Changing Turkish Attitudes towards the EU 
As Figure 3.1 shows, Turkish opinion about the EU changed significantly over 
time. In 2002, 67 percent of the Turkish public evaluated EU membership as a good 
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thing. The EU support reached its peak before the start of accession negotiations. 
Muftuler-Bac (Europe’s world, October 1 2013) describes the scene in Turkey at the start 
of accession negotiations in this way: “the Turkish mood was celebratory and the future 
for economic and political developments in Turkey also looked hopeful”. Nevertheless, 
within a year of the start of accession negotiations, we observe a sharp decline in support 
for EU membership. By 2006, only 44 percent of the Turks were saying that Turkey’s EU 
membership would be a good thing.  After a small rise in 2007, the trend is decline in 
support. By 2012, only 36 percent of the public considered EU membership to be a good 
thing.  
 
Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the EU 
would be…? 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Public Support for the EU, 2002-2012  
Source (CCEB 2002 and CCEB 2003, EB 2004-2012) 
 
  Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011, 368) state that citizens in candidate countries 
generally show more support before the start of accession negotiations that later 
evaporates during the negotiation process. The reason is that, as time passes, a more 
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informed public becomes disappointed with the fact that there will be inevitable loss of 
sovereignty, and starts to think how country specific sensibilities would be handled. 
The authors underline that the Turkish case is atypical because such a drop 
happened very early in the negotiation stages. However, I think there are similarities in 
terms of changing patterns of support between the Turkish case and the Polish case. For 
instance, in his study of Polish public opinion, Sczerbiak (2001) provides information 
about Polish support for EU membership 1994-1999. “When Poland formally submitted 
its application in 1994, 77 percent of citizens expressed their support.  In 1997, 63 
percent of Poles said they would vote yes in a possible referendum whereas in 1999, just 
one year after opening of negotiations, support declined to 59 percent” (Sczerbiak 2001, 
107). I do not have an estimate of support for 1987, the year when Turkey submitted its 
application. Therefore, I cannot compare whether the support level was similar for both 
countries after the submission of application. One of the earliest surveys, conducted in 
1996, indicates that 55 percent of Turkish public said that in a referendum they would 
vote in favor of Turkey’s membership (Carkoglu, and Kalaycioglu 2011).  Compared 
with the figures from the early 2000s, this suggests that Turkish support may have risen 
during and after the application and before the negotiations started, but then dropped once 
serious negotiations were underway. According to Sczerbiak (2001) as the prospect of 
membership became more realistic during the negotiation process, Poles started to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of becoming member in terms of socioeconomic factors.  
The response shown in Figure 3.1 is to the survey question that is commonly used 
by researchers to assess a respondent’s support for membership.  It will be the dependent 
variable in this chapter’s analyses.  The question is as follows: “Generally speaking, do 
42 
 
you think your country’s membership of the EU would be a good thing, a bad thing or 
neither good nor bad?” Since the answers to this question are ordinal, linear estimation 
techniques are inappropriate because they make the implicit assumption that the intervals 
between adjacent categories are equal. Hence, application of maximum likelihood 
techniques is required. Therefore, when using this data to test hypotheses about the 
determinants of support for the EU, I will run ordered probit regression. The coefficients 
for independent variables in an ordered probit model are difficult to interpret, because the 
substantive significance of the independent variables cannot be determined by comparing 
the size of the coefficients.  When interpreting the results I will therefore use the software 
program Clarify to estimate the effect of change in the variables of interest on the 
probability of saying EU membership is a good thing. Clarify is a program that uses 
stochastic simulation techniques to produce quantities of interest such as predicted 
values, expected values or first differences so that researchers can provide substantive 
interpretation to their results (King , Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000, 360). 
In the next section, I will start with a focus on the last data point in my study, 
which is the year 2012. This is the most recent Eurobarometer data, and it thus provides 
the most current snapshot of Turkish attitudes towards the EU from this source.  It will be 
followed by another section investigating changes in Turkish attitudes towards the EU 
over time. 
Explaining Public Opinion in 2012  
In the sections that follow, I will use the EB data to try to explain the 
determinants of EU support in Turkey in the year 2012.   
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I will test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, asking whether Turkish attitudes 
have been formed by the same pressures as have been found in other candidate countries, 
and asking whether a single model can be used to explain support over the course of a 
decade which saw big changes in the context of the EU debates. Table 3.1 presents a 
summary of those hypotheses, shows the EB variables that will be used to test each 
hypothesis, and presents the expected direction of the relationship. 
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Table 3.1 Hypotheses about public support for EU membership 
Factors 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Wording of Question Coding 
Expected 
Effect 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
Sociotropic 
Evaluations 
Hypothesis I What are the expectations for the next twelve 
months: will the next twelve months be better, 
worse or the same, when it comes to the economic 
situation in our country? 
Worse=1; Same=2; Better=3 Positive 
Egocentric  
Evaluations 
Hypothesis 2 What are the expectations for the next twelve 
months: will the next twelve months be better, 
worse or the same, when it comes to the financial 
situation of your household? 
Worse=1; Same=2; Better=3 Positive 
Education Hypothesis 3 How old were you when you stopped full time 
education? 
Respondents who left school at age 15 or younger 
(1);  
Respondents who left school at ages 16 to 19  (2);  
Respondents who stayed in school until they were 
aged 20 or older  
Respondent who are still studying and they are aged 
20 or older  (3) 
Positive 
Manual Worker  Hypothesis 4  What is your current occupation? Manual worker=1; Otherwise=0 Positive 
Professional Worker Hypothesis 5 What is your current occupation? Professional=1; Otherwise=0 Negative 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
Government Support Hypothesis 6  I would like to ask you a question about how much 
trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to 
trust it or tend not to trust it? The government 
Tend to trust=1; Tend not to trust=0 Positive 
System Support Hypothesis 7 On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied 
with the way democracy works in our country? 
Not at all Satisfied=1; Not very Satisfied=2; Fairly 
Satisfied=3; Very Satisfied=4 
Positive 
Party Support AKP Hypothesis 8 Vote intentions next national elections AKP=1; Otherwise=0 Positive 
Party Support CHP Hypothesis 9 Vote intentions next national elections CHP=1; Otherwise=0 Negative 
Party Support MHP Hypothesis 10  Vote intentions next national elections MHP=1; Otherwise=0 Negative 
Id
en
ti
ty
 Loss of Cultural 
Identity 
Hypothesis 11  What does European Union mean personally? Loss of Cultural Identity=1; Otherwise=0 Negative 
Proud of National 
Identity 
Hypothesis 12 Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not 
very proud, not at all proud to be Turkish? 
Not at all=1; Not very proud=2; Fairly proud=3; 
Very proud=4 
Negative 
 Economic Prosperity Hypothesis 13 What does European Union mean personally? Economic Prosperity=1; Otherwise=0 Positive 
Democracy  Hypothesis 14 What does European Union mean personally? Democracy=1; Otherwise=0 Positive 
Freedom of Movement Hypothesis 15  What does European Union mean personally? Freedom of Movement=1; Otherwise=0 Positive 
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Building on the previous studies that were described in Chapter 2, the baseline 
model for all of my analyses is based on three main theoretical approaches that put the 
emphasis on the role of economic calculations (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 
1998), political cues (Anderson 1998) and cultural threat and identity (McLaren 2002; 
Hooghe, and Marks 2004). While these theories tap into different aspects of integration, 
together they can offer a comprehensive framework to study public opinion towards EU. 
The main independent variables include prospective sociotropic evaluations, prospective 
egocentric evaluations, trust in government, EU meaning as loss of cultural identity, 
occupational groups and education. In keeping with other studies in this area (Herzog, 
and Tucker 2009; McLaren 2005; Tverdova, and Anderson 2004), I have included gender 
and age as controls in the analyses. However, for the sake of presentational simplicity I 
do not present the coefficients for gender and age in the tables since these variables are 
not directly related to the theories that are being tested here.  
Economic evaluations regarding the national economy and personal financial 
situation are measured by using the following questions:  
“What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve 
months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation in our 
country?” 
 “What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve 
months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the financial situation of your 
household?” 
 
 Answers are recoded as Worse (1) Same (2) and Better (3). The variable “trust in 
government” is a binary variable. “Loss of cultural identity” is also a binary variable. If 
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the respondent chose this item when asked about the meaning of EU personally, it is 
coded as 1; otherwise it is zero. Occupation is measured using two dummy variables: 
manual workers and professionals. The base category is unemployed, house person, 
student and retired. Education, an ordinal variable, is based on the question about the age 
at which respondents stopped full time education. There are three categories: 15 or 
younger, 16 to 19, and 20 or older.  Following Hakhverdian et al. (2013), I coded the 
respondents who stated they are still studying based on their age. If the respondent is 20 
years old or older, he/she is assigned to the group 20 or older.  I excluded the small 
number of respondents who are still studying and who are younger than 20. 
The first column of Table 3.2, reports the coefficients for baseline model of 
determinants of Turkish public support for the EU for the year 2012. Using CLARIFY, I 
calculated first differences. Table 3.7 shows the results of change in predicted 
probabilities for a respondent evaluating EU membership as a good thing if the variable 
of interest is moved from its minimum value to its maximum value while all other 
variables are set to its mean values.  
Drawing on the economy voting theory, Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 2 asserted that 
respondents who expect that the economy will do better in the coming years will be more 
supportive of the EU. Hypothesis 2 asserted that respondents who expect that their 
personal economic situation will improve in the coming years will be more supportive of 
the EU. This analysis of Turkish attitudes towards the EU in 2012 only partly confirms 
these expectations. The results show that both sociotropic and egocentric expectations do 
play a role in the formation of attitudes towards EU, but not necessarily in the expected 
way. Previous studies of both candidate and member countries have shown that when 
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people are optimistic about national economic conditions, they are more likely to support 
the EU. In contrast to these earlier studies, Table 3.2 shows a negative sign for the 
coefficient for prospective national economic expectations, meaning that in 2012, Turkish 
citizens who were optimistic about national economic conditions were less likely to say 
that the EU is a good thing. It is important to note that the p-value associated with this 
variable is 0.056, or just slightly above traditional thresholds of statistical significance. 
This necessitates further analysis to understand whether the trend in the following years 
will also have negative sign and be statistically significant. The change in the probability 
of observing the outcome Y=3 (EU membership is a good thing) when the independent 
variable sociotropic expectations move from worse to better holding all others at its mean 
is 0.10.  This effect is less than what we observed for some years but it is still not a small 
effect. 
The 2012 results in Table 3.2 provide more support for the egocentric support 
hypothesis.  As expected, it shows that when people evaluate their financial situation 
positively, they are more likely to say EU membership is a good thing. The effect of the 
egocentric expectations variable is substantively large, with a value of 0.22. 
Hypotheses 3 through 5 relate personal resources to EU attitudes.  One of these 
resources is education.  The prediction of Hypothesis 3 is that higher education levels 
will be associated with more positive support for the EU, because those with the most 
education potentially have the most to gain from the changes. In 2012, the education 
variable is statistically significant; however, contrary to predictions it has a negative sign. 
As the level of education increases, Turkish respondents were less likely to say EU 
membership is a good thing.  
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Furthermore, both of the occupational groups have a negative sign, although only 
the manual worker variable is statistically significant. If the respondent is manual worker, 
he/she is less likely to say EU membership is a good thing. This is contrary to our 
expectation as Hypothesis 4 stated that manual workers would express more support 
because Turkey is a labor abundant country, and manual workers would benefit from EU 
opportunities to find employment in higher-wage states.  
Following Anderson’s proxy theory of support for integration, Hypothesis 6 
predicts that if the respondent expresses trust in national government, she/he will be more 
supportive of the EU. However, Table 3.2 shows us that in this model the trust in 
government variable is not significant. It is puzzling that we do not observe a significant 
relationship. Based on past research from other candidate countries, we would expect 
Turkish publics to depend on proxies such as attitudes towards national political 
institutions when forming their opinion.  This relationship was not evident in Turkey in 
2012.  A subsequent section will investigate whether this is a new or a long term 
development, looking at the relation between trust in government and EU support over 
time.  
Hypothesis 11 posits that respondents’ national identity is a source of public 
opinion towards the EU (Hooghe, and Marks 2004).  Unfortunately, this is hard to 
directly test with EB data in a longitudinal analysis because questions that ask directly 
about national identity are not continuously asked in all surveys.  Questions that are 
asked only occasionally include “strength of attachment to one’s country”, “strength of 
national pride” and “the notion of national identity in inclusive versus exclusive terms”.  
However, we can test it using a close proxy. The impact of fear of losing cultural identity 
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on support for European integration project was first investigated by McLaren (2004).  
Similar to other scholars (Arikan 2013; Jolly, and Oktay 2012), I utilized the question 
that asks the meaning of EU personally to the respondents and provides response items 
one of which is loss of cultural identity.  The advantage of using this question is it is 
available in all surveys. Table 3.2 shows that in 2012 the variable “Loss of cultural 
identity” is statistically significant for explaining EU attitudes, and it has a negative sign. 
People who associate the EU with loss of cultural identity are less likely to support EU 
membership. This finding is in line with the finding of previous studies (McLaren 2007). 
Moreover, calculating predicted probabilities shows that its substantive effect is large 
compared to other variables.  If the respondent identifies the EU with the loss of cultural 
identity, the change in the predicted probability of expressing EU support is - 0.20, 
holding all other variables at its mean.  
Table 3.2, column 2 re-estimates the model for 2012 with three additional dummy 
variables. In Chapter 2, I argued that since Turkey is a candidate country and EU 
membership is not in the foreseeable future, the Turkish public might evaluate the EU in 
terms of their own notions of what the EU stands for. Hence, I identified the most 
frequently selected response items to the question “What does EU mean to you 
personally?” These items were: democracy, economic prosperity and freedom of 
movement. The other items that are not utilized are: peace, social protection, cultural 
diversity, stronger say in the world, Euro, bureaucracy, waste of money, more crime, not 
enough control at external frontiers.
2
    
The results of the model in column 2 show that people who associate the EU with 
economic prosperity are more likely to say that the EU is a good thing. Respondents who 
                                                 
2
 I identified these items based on their frequency  
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selected the item “the EU means freedom to travel, work and study in anywhere in 
Europe” are also more likely to support EU. On the other hand, when these variables are 
included, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is a relation between people’s 
identification of EU with democracy and attitudes towards EU.  This is contrary to our 
expectations and needs further exploration.   The substantive effects of these definitional 
variables can shed light on the degree of importance attached by the respondents when 
forming their opinion about the EU. In that case, predicted values show that associating 
the EU with economic prosperity has the most impact, with a value of 0.29, followed by 
associating the EU with a loss of cultural identity, which has a value of -0.16. The 
freedom of movement variable has a value of 0.09. 
The preceding analysis gives a snapshot of Turkish public opinion towards the EU 
in 2012.  The results show that Turkish attitudes have largely responded to the same 
forces that have shaped opinion in other candidate countries. However, there are some 
notable exceptions to this generalization, including the negative relation between 
education and EU attitudes, and manual worker and EU attitudes. While human capital 
variables; education and manual worker are not in the expected direction, they do play a 
role in the formation attitudes. In the case of previous candidate countries, the impact of 
human capital variables on attitudes was not consistently supported by the data. A 
noneconomic factor, identity is important in explaining attitudes towards EU. This is 
similar to findings from studies of previous candidate countries. In contrast to 
expectations, attitudes towards domestic political institution is not are good predictors of 
support, while economic evaluations--which require some level of cognitive 
mobilization--are utilized by Turkish public when answering questions about the EU.  
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The question explored in the next section is whether these relationships have been 
stable over time, or whether the determinants of EU attitudes have shifted over time as a 
result of contextual factors, including the shifting economic landscape and the shifting 
climate of accession negotiations.  Put differently, can the decline in public support for 
the EU, shown in Figure 3.1, be explained by shifting values in the independent variables 
that are important in Table 3.2, or has the model itself changed over time? 
Exploring Changes in Turkish Attitudes towards the EU Over Time 
 
  In order to study the shifting climate of Turkish public opinion towards the EU, 
Table 3.3 provides the results of an ordered probit regression analysis for each year 
during the time period of 2002-2012. Focusing on a long time period will provide us 
information about whether the determinants of Turkish attitudes towards the EU have 
been consistent, or whether they have changed over time. 
Economic Considerations 
One of the surprising findings in the 2012 data was that economic evaluations 
regarding the national economy had a negative impact on EU evaluations.  Table 3.3 
shows that this finding is relatively new in Turkey. In earlier years the relation was 
positive and statistically significant (e.g., 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009), as predicted by 
Hypothesis 1 and by much research from other countries, or else the relationship was not 
statistically significant.  In other words, these findings suggest a big shift in the decade in 
the way that opinions about the national economy influence Turkish thinking about 
whether EU membership would be a good thing. Similar findings were presented by 
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Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) though these scholars found that economic evaluations 
changed character in 2009. 
Egocentric economic evaluations are significant for the years 2003, 2004, 2006, 
2011 and 2012. They are also in the expected direction, supporting our hypothesis that 
says that a respondent who evaluate that his/her financial situation of the household will 
get better in the coming years, will be more likely to support EU. This stability is in 
contrast to the flip in the impact of sociotropic evaluations. 
Domestic Political Considerations 
Trust in government is most of the time period statistically significant except a 
few years; 2003, 2004 and 2012, as previously mentioned. The results suggest that 
respondents who indicate support for the incumbent government are more likely to 
support membership for the EU. This finding supports the hypothesis that citizens will 
use proxies to evaluate the EU, particularly in candidate countries in which citizens have 
relatively little information about the EU. No doubt, the most important interpreter of 
what the EU stands for is the government, which is the chief negotiator with the EU. 
Since AKP is the ruling party since 2002, trust in government also meant trust in AKP. In 
2012, it is possible that as AKP government lost its zeal for the EU, the link between 
government support and EU support also blurred.  I will explore the impact of partisan 
political support further in Chapter 4. 
Human Capital 
Previously, I mentioned that the education variable had a negative sign and was 
statistically significant for the year 2012. It is not possible to talk about the same relation 
between level of education and EU support during the earlier years. In 2002, the finding 
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supports the hypothesis that as education level increases, respondents become more likely 
to express positive thoughts about EU membership. However, we do not see any 
significant relationship in between 2002 and 2012. 
Most of the time, we do not observe a significant relationship between the two 
occupational groups and evaluations of EU. Since Turkey is relatively abundant in low 
skilled labour, we would expect that manual workers would be more likely to be in favor 
of Turkey’s EU membership (Hypothesis 4). Only in 2007 do we find support for this 
hypothesis that manual workers are more likely to support EU membership. However, in 
2012, we find that the variable is statistically significant but the sign of the coefficient is 
in the opposite direction. In other words, the results show that manual workers were 
never more likely to say that EU membership is a good thing.  
Identity 
The variable loss of cultural identity is consistently significant and has a negative 
sign in all the years with the exception of year 2005, when EU opened accession 
negotiations with Turkey.  In 2005, the variable is not statistically significant.  The table 
3.7 shows that this variable’s effect is substantively large compared to the effect of other 
variables. 
EU meaning 
Table 3.4 provides results for the ordered probit model where I explore the effect 
of EU meaning questions in addition to baseline variables for the years between 2002 and 
2012. Previously, I mentioned that economic prosperity has a big substantive effect for 
the year 2012. A look at the past decade shows that economic prosperity variable is 
consistently positive and statistically significant. When the value of the variable is 
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changed from 0 to 1 while keeping all other variables at its mean value, the change in 
predicted probability of a respondent saying that the EU is a good thing is consistently 
large over the years. It is important to note that the impact of this variable is lowest in 
2002, when the change in predicted probability caused by this variable is only 10 %, 
much lower than in following years.  This could be related to the economic crisis of 2001, 
but I suspect that this is actually related to a slight difference in the question wording 
used in this year. Unfortunately, the item list regarding the question about the meaning of 
the EU in the 2002 CEEB survey is slightly different than other surveys utilized in this 
study. Respondents were asked to choose the statement that best describes what EU 
means to them personally. The 2002 survey includes this statement “A means of 
improving the Economic situation in the European Union”. However, in all other years 
this option is phrased more simply as “economic prosperity”.  In contrast, in 2003 the 
calculation of first differences results in value of 0.36 for this variable. This variable has 
a strong effect on the dependent variable and this is consistent over the years. 
 In the 2002 and 2003 CEEB surveys, the EU meaning question did not include the 
item “democracy”. Therefore I utilized the item “A way to protect the rights of citizens” 
as a proxy for evaluating the attitudinal effect of the perception that the EU stands for 
democracy, since the rule of law in democracies guarantee the protection of citizen rights. 
The respondents who associate EU with democracy are more likely to say the EU is a 
good thing. This variable is statistically significant and positive between 2002 and 2010. 
Yet this, too, seems to change over time.  In 2011 and 2012, the variable is no longer 
statistically significant, and we no longer find support for the hypothesis that EU meaning 
as a democracy has an impact on the formation of attitudes towards the EU. In contrast, 
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the variable “EU meaning as free movement of travel, work and study anywhere in the 
union” is statistically significant and its effect is consistent over time. Yet here too, we 
see some change in the model.  One year after the beginning of accession negotiations, in 
2006, this variable has a large substantive impact with a value of 0.26 on the predicted 
probability when its value changed from 0 to 1 holding all other variables at its mean. As 
time passes, the effect decreases. 
System Support 
Table 3.5 provides the results of ordered probit regression when the satisfaction 
with democracy variable is added to the baseline model. Although this question is not 
available for all the years, it is available for most of them.  I tried to look at its effect on 
the formation Turkish attitudes towards the EU whenever (years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 
2009, and 2010) the question was asked. In doing so, I am following Anderson (1998), 
who uses satisfaction with the way democracy works as an indicator of system support. 
The question is as follows “On the whole are you (very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied, not at all satisfied) with the way democracy works in (Our Country)?” Similar 
to evaluating the impact of trust in government, using this variable moves the research 
beyond emphasizing only economic calculations when studying public opinion about EU. 
However, a look at the results shows that only in 2002 did satisfaction with democracy 
have a statistically significant impact on Turkish attitudes towards the EU.  In that year 
the relationship was positive, meaning the more respondents are satisfied with democracy 
in Turkey, the more likely they were to say that the EU is a good thing.  It is possible that 
the reason this relationship was found only early in the process was because that was 
when the EU was putting most pressure on Turkey to adopt institutional changes that 
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strengthened democracy. Kalaycioglu (2011) describes the high number of constitutional 
amendments that took place in 2001 as part of Turkish efforts to improve Turkish 
democracy in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. It is possible that these attempts to 
promote democracy were linked to EU membership by the public. However, this 
explanation is not entirely satisfying, because in later years, this variable is not 
significant, even though the government continued to introduce constitutional 
amendments that also responded to EU pressures.  
Kalaycioglu (2011) differentiates democratization attempts into two periods in 
terms of the way they were handled in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. According 
to Kalaycioglu, from 1993 to 2002 all major parties work together through deliberation 
and compromise to pass the constitutional amendments that promoted political liberties 
and rights. “A second period seems to have started in 2002, in which constitutional 
amendments were presented as the partisan accomplishment of the AKP” (Kalaycioglu 
2011, 276). It is possible to articulate that democratization efforts at first were welcomed 
with enthusiasm. However, over time this enthusiasm faded away. In the later period, it is 
possible that public opinion did not link democratization efforts with the EU influence 
due to the AKP’s role as the initiator of all the changes.  For instance, the issue of 
Kurdish rights under the heading of improvement in the situation of minority rights is 
viewed as a threat to national unity. Yilmaz (2011, 196) states that the CHP leaders 
argued that “the AKP has abused the EU-related democratic reforms to ‘soften’ the 
military and other forces of the secularist establishment, thereby clearing the ground to 
realise their final goal of putting an end to the secular order and Islamicising the Turkish 
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state and society.”  Chapter 4 will use other data to try to disentangle the impact of party 
support and support for democracy on attitudes towards the EU. 
Table 3.6 provides the results of ordered probit regression where I added the pride 
in nationality variable to the baseline model. This question is included in the surveys for 
some years (2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005). This question might provide a better measure 
of identity effect than threat to cultural identity question. However, it is not asked after 
2005. Still, I wanted to investigate its effects for those years. The question is as follows 
“Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, and not at all proud to 
be (NATIONALITY)? Very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud” The 
variable is statistically significant in 2004 and has the expected sign, meaning the more 
respondent is proud of being Turkish, the less likely he/she is to say membership in the 
EU is a good thing. When we change the value of this variable from minimum to 
maximum, it has an impact of 18 percent on the dependent variable while holding all 
other variables in its mean. Furthermore, incorporating this variable to the baseline model 
did not lead any changes in the variable “Loss of Cultural Identity” 
Explaining the Longitudinal Changes In the Model 
 
Looking at a period of ten years shows that the effect of variables changed over 
time. Overall, economic factors seem to play an important role in the formation of 
attitudes towards EU. The results suggest that people utilize their evaluations regarding 
the economic situation in Turkey and the financial situation of their household when 
asked about their opinion on EU membership. Up until 2009, people who expect that 
national economic situation will get better were more likely to say that the EU is a good 
thing. After this, the results suggest that the impact of economic evaluations might have 
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changed. In 2011 and 2012, people who expect that national economic situation will get 
better were no more likely to say EU is a good thing. This can be due to changing 
circumstances both in Turkey and the European Union.  I referred to the Eurozone crisis 
in Chapter 2. When the EU was struggling with its own financial problems, the debt crisis 
in Greece and in Cyprus was covered by the Turkish media. From 2009-2012, while 
Europe was experiencing a recession, the Turkish economy was relatively strong. In this 
period the Turkish political elite seldom missed an opportunity to state that the EU needs 
Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU. Furthermore, former Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan and his ministers frequently used the rhetoric of economic stability and 
growth during their government.  Jolly and Oktay (2012, 9) state that “positive 
developments in the Turkish economy since 2002 compel us to think that the EU’s 
economic appeal may begin to fade as the country begins to gain economic strength 
without the EU anchor”. Although we see a decline in Turkish economic growth around 
the time of the global economic crisis in 2009, as Jolly and Oktay (2012, 10) say “the 
country was able to maneuver its way out of the crisis without major damages”. The 
authors include the Turkish GDP per capita/EU exports ratio in their model to look at the 
effect of economy on attitudes. They found that as GDP per capital relative to EU GDP 
per capita increases, Turkish public support for the EU decreases.  
To explore the impact of economic changes on how Turkish citizens evaluate EU 
membership, I will look at the impact of GDP growth rate in Turkey in the formation of 
attitudes towards EU.  In order to do this, I will estimate multilevel mixed effects ordered 
logistic regression, using economic variable at the country level alongside individual-
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level variables.  The annual percentage growth rate of GDP is taken from World Bank 
data. 
 The reason, I chose to estimate this model is that I can present the results in terms 
of odds ratios. Odds ratios are commonly used in survey research as they provide 
substantively meaningful interpretation of results. The dependent variable and all other 
variables from the baseline model are same. I will be adding only annual GDP growth 
rate to the model.  
Figure 3.2 clearly shows how Turkey was affected by the global economic crisis 
of 2009. However, after a sharp decline in GDP growth rate in 2009, we see that Turkey 
was able to position itself better than the Eurozone countries. 
 
Annual GDP Growth Rate 
 
Figure 3.2 Comparison of GDP growth rate for Turkey and Euro 18 
Source: the Worldbank, Eurostat 
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Table 3.8 presents the results of multi-level mixed effects ordinal logistic regression.  The 
variable GDP growth rate has an odds ratio of .991 with p value of 0.037 which means 
that when the Turkish economy does well, it becomes less likely that people will support 
EU membership.  This finding supports our expectation that as the Turkish economy has 
developed; the European Union’s appeal in terms of economic prosperity has faded in the 
eyes of public. 
Highlights of Main Findings 
Most of the time--except the year 2012-- the trust in government variable is 
statistically significant, suggesting that government support as a proxy plays an important 
role in terms of explaining Turkish public opinion towards EU. Another proxy system 
support variable, measured as satisfaction with democracy, does not perform as well as in 
the case of Bulgaria.  It is possible to speculate that in the beginning of the decade 
democratic reforms were welcomed by many and passed in the parliament by coalition 
governments through negotiations. Hence, the link between EU support and satisfaction 
with democracy was established in the eyes of the public. However, over time the link 
between the two became irrelevant. 
The effect of economic evaluations is not uniform over time. At first, the 
relationship between prospective economic evaluations and EU support was positive. 
Later we witness the changing nature of this trend. 
The variable “loss of cultural identity” is consistently significant and has a 
negative impact on the dependent variable. While this result was expected, it is important 
to note that its impact is substantively large.  
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Occupational groups do not have much explanatory power. It might be that since 
Turkish membership to EU is not seen credible, we do not see the relation between 
interest calculations and opinion formation. It is interesting to note that at the end of the 
time period of this study, we see that manual workers became less likely to support EU 
membership whereas in 2007, manual workers were more likely to say EU membership is 
a good thing.  
Furthermore, in 2012 the results show that as the education level increases, people 
become less likely to support EU membership. However, in the beginning of the data 
series, in 2002, the education variable was in the expected direction. Overall, the findings 
suggest that different segments of society become less likely to evaluate EU membership 
as a good thing in 2012.  
 
The next chapter will explore the unexplained part of the puzzle, the impact of 
political affiliations. So far we looked only at the effect of government support and 
system support rather than directly measuring partisan impacts, since Eurobarometer 
surveys after year 2003 did not have question about vote intentions. That is why Chapter 
4 will turn to other data that can help unravel this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Table 3.2 Ordered Probit Models of Turkish Public Support for the EU in 2012 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Prospective Sociotopic -0.137 * -0.133   
 0.072  0.072   
Prospective Egocentric 0.288 *** 0.28 *** 
 0.076  0.077   
Trust Government 0.14  0.078   
 0.1  0.101   
Loss of Cultural Identity -0.555 *** -0.436 *** 
 0.112  0.115   
Education -0.208 ** -0.232 *** 
 0.066  0.067   
Manual Worker -0.356 * -0.49 *** 
 0.144  0.148   
Professional -0.103  -0.179   
 0.119  0.121   
Economic Prosperity   0.758 *** 
   0.105   
Free Movement   0.24 * 
   0.112   
Democracy   0.151   
   0.122   
cut1     
_cons -0.969 *** -0.718 * 
 0.278  0.286   
cut2     
_cons -0.376  -0.08   
 0.277  0.285   
chi2 66.5 *** 133 *** 
Log Likelihood -666.7  -633.59  
Pseudo R square 0.05  0.09  
Number of Obs. 657  657  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
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Table 3.3a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU, 2002-2006 
 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  
Prospective Sociotopic 0.026  0.248 *** 0.229 *** 0.337 *** 0.115  
 0.071  0.072  0.052  0.087  0.076  
Prospective Egocentric 0.043  0.164 * 0.122 * 0.032  0.237 ** 
 0.075  0.078  0.057  0.093  0.083  
Trust Government 0.34 *** -0.111  0.114  0.457 *** 0.43 *** 
 0.095  0.103  0.082  0.119  0.11  
Loss of Cultural 
Identity 
-0.656 *** -0.78 *** -0.684 *** 0.22  -0.772 *** 
 0.094  0.095  0.078  0.136  0.119  
Education 0.179 ** 0.077  -0.044  0.056  0.093  
 0.065  0.068  0.047  0.07  0.072  
Manual Worker -0.063  -0.051  0.016  0.174  -0.047  
 0.171  0.144  0.113  0.164  0.153  
Professional -0.105  0.109  -0.111  -0.083  -0.09  
 0.118  0.119  0.087  0.142  0.129  
cut1           
_cons -0.905 *** -0.666 * -1.08 *** 0.121  0.186  
 0.245  0.264  0.189  0.281  0.27  
cut2           
_cons -0.241  0.05  -0.349  0.812 ** 0.925 *** 
 0.243  0.263  0.187  0.282  0.272  
chi2 72 *** 110 *** 167 *** 83.5 *** 99.1 *** 
Log Likelihood -615.5  -611.3  -1144  -490.4  -613  
Pseudo R square 0.06  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.07  
Number of Obs. 784  822  1542  565  635  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3.3b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU, 2007-2012 
(continued) 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  
Prospective Sociotopic 0.067  0.092  0.182 *** 0.036  -0.133  -0.137 * 
 0.07  0.058  0.05  0.056  0.075  0.072   
Prospective Egocentric 0.047  0.039  0.012  -0.011  0.171 * 0.288 *** 
 0.081  0.054  0.053  0.06  0.071  0.076   
Trust Government 0.344 ** 0.327 *** 0.195 ** 0.455 *** 0.451 *** 0.14   
 0.113  0.07  0.068  0.072  0.106  0.1   
Loss of Cultural Identity -0.863 *** -0.866 *** -0.755 *** -0.875 *** -0.576 *** -0.555 *** 
 0.118  0.086  0.088  0.082  0.11  0.112   
Education -0.063  0.065  0.029  -0.051  0.026  -0.208 ** 
 0.07  0.045  0.044  0.048  0.062  0.066   
Manual Worker 0.349 * -0.106  0.058  0.034  -0.172  -0.356 * 
 0.163  0.097  0.094  0.104  0.139  0.144   
Professional -0.016  0.004  -0.015  -0.039  -0.132  -0.103   
 0.124  0.084  0.086  0.088  0.126  0.119   
cut1             
_cons -0.463  -0.305  -0.172  -0.61 ** -0.476  -0.969 *** 
 0.28  0.173  0.164  0.189  0.261  0.278   
cut2             
_cons 0.072  0.264  0.379 * -0.131  0.12  -0.376   
 0.279  0.173  0.164  0.188  0.261  0.277   
chi2 83.9 *** 156 *** 123 *** 193 *** 64 *** 66.5 *** 
Log Likelihood -583.4  -1294  -1379  -1246  -687.5  -666.7   
Pseudo R square 0.07  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.04  0.05  
Number of Obs. 639  1339  1400  1335  681  657  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Table 3.4a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: the Role of EU’s 
Meaning, 2002-2006 
 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  
Prospective Sociotropic 0.038  0.18 * 0.19 *** 0.299 *** 0.104  
 0.075  0.077  0.054  0.089  0.077  
Prospective Egocentric 0.027  0.171 * 0.082  -0.002  0.164  
 0.079  0.083  0.059  0.095  0.086  
Trust Government 0.248 * -0.15  0.195 * 0.387 ** 0.394 *** 
 0.101  0.109  0.086  0.122  0.112  
Loss of Cultural Identity -0.79 *** -0.74 *** -0.62 *** 0.109  -0.56 *** 
 0.102  0.102  0.082  0.143  0.126  
Economic Prosperity 0.277 * 1.05 *** 0.719 *** 0.661 *** 0.527 *** 
 0.11  0.102  0.073  0.117  0.106  
Free Movement 0.414 *** 0.645 *** 0.279 *** 0.37 ** 0.662 *** 
 0.115  0.105  0.074  0.124  0.141  
Democracy 0.827 ***   0.484 *** 0.517 *** 0.553 *** 
 0.112    0.083  0.151  0.13  
Education 0.105  0.048  -0.05  0.038  0.044  
 0.069  0.073  0.049  0.073  0.074  
Manual Worker -0.08  0.048  0.024  0.059  -0.05  
 0.183  0.152  0.117  0.17  0.156  
Professional -0.09  0.207  -0.06  -0.05  -0.13  
 0.126  0.129  0.091  0.147  0.132  
cut1           
_cons -0.3  0.072  -0.63 ** 0.266  0.304  
 0.263  0.29  0.2  0.291  0.277  
cut2           
_cons 0.495  0.966 *** 0.2 *** 1.02 *** 1.12  
 0.263  0.291  0.2  0.292  0.28  
chi2 226  298  368  150  180  
Log Likelihood -539  -517  -1043  -457  -572  
Pseudo R square 0.17  0.22  0.15  0.14  0.14  
Number of Obs. 784  822  1542  565  635  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3.4b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: the Role of EU’s 
Meaning, 2007-2012 (continued) 
 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  
Prospective 
Sociotropic 
0.04  0.079  0.231 *** 0.036  -0.125  -0.133   
 0.071  0.059  0.051  0.058  0.076  0.072   
Prospective 
Egocentric 
0.054  0.053  -0.052  -0.012  0.168 * 0.28 *** 
 0.083  0.056  0.054  0.061  0.072  0.077   
Trust Government 0.348 *** 0.337 *** 0.168 * 0.436 *** 0.428 *** 0.078   
 0.116  0.072  0.069  0.074  0.107  0.101   
Loss of Cultural 
Identity 
-0.787 *** -0.658 *** -0.469 *** -0.734 *** -0.477 *** -0.436 *** 
 0.122  0.089  0.092  0.084  0.112  0.115   
Economic Prosperity 0.762 *** 0.758 *** 0.804 *** 0.768 *** 0.419 *** 0.758 *** 
 0.112  0.072  0.073  0.073  0.101  0.105   
Free Movement 0.349 *** 0.482 *** 0.156 * 0.464 *** 0.266  0.24 * 
 0.11  0.078  0.072  0.081  0.108  0.112   
Democracy 0.382 ** 0.489 *** 0.459 *** 0.363 *** 0.152  0.151   
 0.144  0.09  0.087  0.085  0.116  0.122   
Education -0.085  0.066  0.005  -0.051  0.013  -0.232 *** 
 0.072  0.047  0.045  0.049  0.063  0.067   
Manual Worker 0.369 * -0.117  0.1  0.017  -0.187  -0.49 *** 
 0.168  0.1  0.096  0.107  0.14  0.148   
Professional -0.064  0.047  -0.006  -0.035  -0.089  -0.179   
 0.127  0.086  0.088  0.091  0.127  0.121   
cut1             
_cons -0.183  0.23  0.156  -0.175  -0.192  -0.718 * 
 0.29  0.183  0.171  0.198  0.269  0.286   
cut2             
_cons 0.4  0.863 *** 0.753 *** 0.354  0.421  -0.08  
 0.291  0.184  0.171  0.198  0.269  0.285   
chi2 153  347  283  371  93  133   
Log Likelihood -548.8  -
1199.2 
 -
1299.5 
 -
1157.3 
 -
672.97 
 -
633.59 
  
Pseudo R square 0.12  0.13  0.10  0.14  0.06  0.09  
Number of Obs. 639  1339  1400  1335  681  657  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3.5 Ordered Probit Model of Turkish Support for the EU: the Role of 
Satisfaction with Democracy in Turkey 
 2002  2003  2004  2006  2009  2010  
Prospective Sociotropic 0.005  0.247 *** 0.236 *** 0.107  0.184 * 0.109  
 0.072  0.073  0.053  0.078  0.073  0.081  
Prospective Egocentric 0.04  0.167 * 0.128 * 0.213 * 0.069  -0.12  
 0.075  0.079  0.058  0.085  0.077  0.087  
Trust Government 0.247 * -0.09  0.124  0.393 *** 0.142  0.304 ** 
 0.098  0.104  0.085  0.116  0.097  0.11  
Loss of Cultural Identity -0.66 *** -0.77 *** -0.68 *** -0.8 *** -0.77 *** -1.13 *** 
 0.095  0.095  0.079  0.122  0.132  0.126  
Satisfaction with Democracy  0.259 *** -0.05  -0.02  0.095  0.019  0.076  
 0.068  0.058  0.041  0.06  0.056  0.058  
Education 0.178 ** 0.072  -0.04  0.103  0.042  -0.04  
 0.065  0.068  0.048  0.073  0.064  0.067  
Manual Worker -0.02  -0.06  -0.003  -0.04  0.101  0.034   
 0.172  0.146  0.113  0.155  0.138  0.147  
Professional -0.08  0.105  -0.11  -0.08  0.027  -0.12  
 0.119  0.12  0.088  0.132  0.125  0.12  
cut1             
_cons -0.53 * -0.75 ** -1.08 *** 0.359  0.022  -0.9 *** 
 0.262  0.286  0.203  0.284  0.251  0.269  
cut2             
_cons 0.145  -0.05  -0.35  1.08 *** 0.584 * -0.3  
 0.262  0.285  0.202  0.286  0.251  0.268  
chi2 87.2 *** 109 *** 163 *** 101 *** 63.4 *** 107 *** 
Log Likelihood -603  -604  -1114  -588  -676  -574   
Pseudo R square 0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.04  0.09  
Number of Obs. 779  811  1508  613  681  628  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3.6 Ordered Probit Model of Turkish Public Support for the EU: the Role of 
Pride in Nationality 
 2002  2003  2004  2005  
Prospective Sociotropic 0.035  0.248 *** 0.247 *** 0.339 *** 
 0.072  0.072  0.068  0.087   
Prospective Egocentric 0.054  0.179 * 0.095  0.038   
 0.076  0.079  0.077  0.093   
Trust Government 0.362 *** -0.09  0.246  0.44 *** 
 0.099  0.107  0.128  0.12   
Loss of Cultural Identity -0.6 *** -0.76 *** -0.98 *** 0.22   
 0.096  0.096  0.116  0.137   
Proud of Nationality 0.032  -0.1  -0.22 * -0.06   
 0.062  0.076  0.108  0.1   
Education 0.219 ** 0.076  0.022  0.053   
 0.067  0.069  0.068  0.071   
Manual -0.05  -0.07  -0.16  0.169   
 0.173  0.144  0.165  0.164   
Professional -0.05  0.076  -0.33 ** -0.08   
 0.121  0.12  0.124  0.143   
cut1         
_cons -0.59  -0.98 ** -1.91 *** -0.1   
 0.323  0.363  0.487  0.463   
cut2         
_cons 0.087  -0.27  -1.05 * 0.594   
 0.322  0.362  0.484  0.463   
chi2 69.1  112  132  82.6   
Log Likelihood -591  -604  -574  -486   
Pseudo R square 0.055  0.085  0.103  0.078  
Number of Obs. 747  817  733  559  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001. 
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Table 3.7 Change in Predicted Probabilities 
Table 3.3a & 3.3b 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Prospective Sociotropic 0.02  0.17 * 0.16 * 0.26 * 0.10  0.05  0.07  0.14 * 0.03  -0.10   -0.10 
Prospective Egocentric 0.03  0.12 * 0.08 * 0.03  0.18 * 0.04  0.03  0.01  -0.01  0.14 * 0.22 
Trust Government  0.12 * -0.04  0.04  0.18 * 0.17 * 0.14 * 0.13 * 0.08 * 0.18 * 0.18 * 0.05 
Loss of Cultural Identity -0.24 * -0.28 * -0.25 * 0.08  -0.29 * -0.33 * -0.32 * -0.29 * -0.33 * -0.22 * -0.20 
Education 0.12 * 0.05  -0.03  0.04  0.07  -0.05  0.05  0.02  -0.04  0.02  -0.16 
Manual Worker -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.06  -0.02  0.13 * -0.04  0.02  0.01  -0.06  -0.13 
Professional -0.04  0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04 
Table 3.4a & 3.4b 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Economic Prosperity 0.09 * 0.36 * 0.23 * 0.24 * 0.21 * 0.28 * 0.29 * 0.31 * 0.30 * 0.17 * 0.29 
Free movement 0.15 * 0.21 * 0.09 * 0.13 * 0.25 * 0.13 * 0.19 * 0.06 * 0.18  0.11 * 0.09 
Democracy 0.28 * n/a  0.14 * 0.18 * 0.21 * 0.15 * 0.19 * 0.18 * 0.14 * 0.06  0.06 
Table 3.5 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 0.23 * -0.05  -0.02  n/a  0.11  n/a  n/a  0.02  0.09  n/a  n/a 
Table 3.6 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Proud of Nationality 0.04  -0.08  -0.19 * -0.06  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Note: Cell reports change in the predicted probability of a hypothetical respondent saying “EU membership is a good thing” as the variable of interest is moved 
from its minimum to maximum value while all other variables are set to its mean. * p < 0.05 
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Table 3.8 Multi-level Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistic Regression  
Individual Level Variables Odds Ratio 
 Prospective Sociotropic 1.166 *** 
  0.037  
 Prospective Egocentric 1.172 *** 
  0.039  
 Trust Government 1.593 *** 
  0.069  
 Loss of Cultural Identity 0.327 *** 
  0.015  
 Education 1.017  
  0.028  
 Manual Worker 0.996  
  0.062  
 Professional 0.940  
  0.049  
   
 Country Level Variables                          
 
GDPgrowthrate 0.992 * 
 
 
0.004 
  
/cut1 -0.561 *** 
 
 
0.108 
  
/cut2 0.421 *** 
 
 
0.107 
  
year 
   
var(_cons) 0.673 
  
 
0.067 
  
Wald chi2 904.04 
  
Log Likelihood -9544 
  
Number of Obs. 10399  
Note: Cell reports odd ratios for multi level mixed effects ordered logistic regression and displays standard 
errors under the odd ratios. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Analyses performed using STATA 13.1 
meglm commands 
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CHAPTER 4 – 
Party Support and Attitudes towards the EU 
 
 
Many scholars (Anderson 1998; Tverdova, and Anderson 2004; Gabel and 
Scheve 2007) argue that citizens rely on cues taken from the political parties they support 
when answering questions about the EU. Based on past research, we expect that 
supporters of political parties opposed to EU membership are less likely to be in favor of 
membership.  Focusing on Turkey over time is a particularly good place to study this 
relationship, because Turkish parties have had changing stances towards EU. Hence, we 
will be asking here: how closely do party supporters follow these changes? 
This chapter aims to explore this relationship between political party preferences 
and attitudes towards the EU.  In order to fulfill this objective, I will first refer to studies 
that looked at Turkish party positions towards the EU. Then, I will introduce the dataset, 
operationalization of the variables and methods. This will be followed by first analysis of 
testing the effect of party preference on support for EU membership over time and then 
analysis of testing the same effect on a pooled data. After presenting the results of tests of 
the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2, I will interpret these results using the Clarify 
program. 
Changing Turkish Party Attitudes towards the EU 
After Turkey was given official candidate status in the Helsinki summit in 1999; 
Turkey’s EU candidacy was no longer a purely foreign policy issue, but became a 
domestic policy issue as well.  This was because candidacy for EU membership requires 
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countries to make a broad set of policy adjustments and legal as well as institutional 
changes.  The parties’ position on the EU developed in the context of their own political 
positions inside and outside of government.  Table 4.1 shows electoral results of the 
period analyzed for the most important of these parties 
 In recent years, scholars (Celep 2011; Gulmez 2013; Jolly and Oktay 2011) have 
studied Turkish party positions towards the EU. They have given different accounts of 
how much the parties have actually differed in their stances.  For instance, Jolly and 
Oktay (2011), looking at the 2007 election, focus on five parties (AKP, CHP, MHP, 
Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), Youth Party (Genc Parti, GP) with particular 
emphasis on three of the major parties that won seats.  The authors conclude that while 
some parties have a Eurosceptic tone in their party manifestos, all the parties show 
commitment to full membership. In other words, while parties may criticize EU, none of 
them are against Turkey’s EU membership. Thus, the authors conclude that they do not 
belong to the hard Eurosceptic category. In contrast, Yilmaz (2011) assesses parties in 
terms of their degree of Euroscepticism between 1987 and 2007, and finds much more 
variation both across parties, and within single parties over time.  According to Yilmaz’s 
study (2011, 13), AKP is considered as a pro-European party. Therefore, it is not 
included in his table of hard/soft Eurosceptics parties. However, the Virtue Party (FP), 
where AKP party’s core members came from, is evaluated as belonging to the 
Eurosceptic-hard category in 1999. MHP, a party with a Turkish nationalist ideology, 
was in the Eurosceptic-soft category in 1999 when it was in the coalition, but then it is 
classified in the Eurosceptic-hard category in 2007 when it became a opposition party. 
Avci agrees with this observation, and (2011, 444) argues that between the years 2002-
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2010, MHP adopted very critical stance: “the MHP has primarily relied on sovereignty-
based Euroscepticism but it has never rejected the European project fully.”  According to 
Yilmaz, CHP, a party with a Kemalist-secularist ideology was a pro-European party 
before the 2002 elections. Celep(2011) draws attention to the role of CHP in the 
development of Turkey and EU relations. It is important to note that both Ankara 
Agreement and accession to the Customs Union were realized when CHP was in the 
coalition government. However, after 2002, Yilmaz classifies CHP as Eurosceptic-soft. 
Celep (2011) argues that the CHP’s scepticism towards EU membership is related to 
CHP’s position in opposition and its fight with AKP. The author argues underlines that 
CHP mainly criticized the way the AKP government was handling the membership 
process rather than the membership itself 
Furthermore, when Turkey became a candidate; it had to carry out political 
reforms in order to meet the EU’s accession criteria so that accession negotiations could 
begin. The reform processes involved improvement of minority rights such as 
legalization of the public use of Kurdish and other minority languages. Yilmaz (2011) 
examines the attitudes of different party supporters on this issue. He states that party 
supporters of Nationalist Action Party (MHP) representing far-right, Turkish ethno-
nationalist constituents are skeptical of the EU. Unsurprisingly, party supporters of the 
Party for a Democratic Society (DTP), a Kurdish nationalist party, the successor party to 
the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), and the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), 
have unconditional support for the EU. In general, the Turkish public perceives the 
reforms to increase Kurdish rights as attempts to undermine the unitary character of the 
Turkish state (Muftuler Bac 2005). Hence, scholars (Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011; 
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Yilmaz 2011) argue that discussion of the issues of reform process in the public agenda 
stimulate national sentiments which in turn cause decline in support levels.  
 In my analysis, I will focus on the three major parties: AKP, the governing party 
since 2002 up until now, CHP, the main opposition party and MHP, the other opposition 
party.
3
 I selected these parties based on their vote and seat shares (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Results of Turkish Parliamentary Elections for the years 2002, 2007 and 2011 
 2002  2007  2011  
 Votes % # of Seats Votes % #  of Seats  Votes % # of Seats 
AKP 34.28 363 46.58 341 49.95 327 
CHP 19.39 178 20.88 112 25.94 135 
MHP 8.36 0 14.27 71 12.98 53 
Independents 1 9 5.24 26 6.57 35 
 
Source: High Election Council (Yuksek Secim Kurulu, YSK) 
 
 
I also want to provide information about the demographics of these parties based on the 
three variables; education, gender and age from the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Voting intention question in CCEB 2003 survey did not include MHP option in the list of party names. 
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Table 4.2 Demographics of Party Constituents in the Study 
 
  
 
AKP CHP MHP 
 
% % % 
Education 
   Left school at age 15 or younger  
67 47 47 
Left school at ages 16 to 19   
22 31 35 
Stayed in school until age 20 or 
older OR still studying and age 
20 or older  11 21 18 
Gender 
   Female 51 50 28 
Male 49 50 72 
Age 
   18-24  20 23 27 
 25-34  29 20 28 
35-44  21 20 22 
45-54  15 17 13 
55-64  9 13 6 
65 years 7 8 3 
Source : (CCEB 2002 and CCEB 2003, Transatlantic Trends surveys, 2003-2013) 
 
Before the analysis section, I want to restate my hypotheses regarding party 
preference, Hypotheses 8, 9, and 10.  Because some of the parties changed their own 
attitudes towards the EU during this decade, and because some of them moved from 
inside to outside government, these hypotheses which predict a stable effect of party 
support potentially come into conflict with Hypothesis 6, which posits that government 
support is a proxy for EU support. Drawing on the studies about Turkish party positions 
on EU membership, I expect to see that party constituents will change their stances as 
their parties change their stances. In that regard, I hypothesize that AKP voters will be 
more likely to support EU membership after their party came to power. CHP voters will 
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be less likely to support EU membership after AKP came to power and their party is in 
opposition. I also expect that MHP voters will be less likely to support EU membership 
after AKP came to power and their party is in opposition. 
Introducing the Data 
In this chapter, I use both Transatlantic Trends Surveys
4
 and Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer Surveys (CCEB) to study changing Turkish attitudes towards the EU for 
the time period 2002-2013, this time taking into account party preferences among 
respondents.
5
 I will be utilizing two CCEB surveys that I used in Chapter 3
6
. 
Transatlantic Trends Surveys are a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United 
States and the Compagnia di San Paolo. These surveys are conducted in the USA and 13 
European countries to understand public opinion about foreign policy issues and trans-
Atlantic issues such as Turkey’s EU membership. The surveys have been conducted 
                                                 
4
 Transatlantic Trend Surveys- 2003 (ICPSR 3972), 2004 (ICPSR 4243), 2005 (ICPSR 4605), 2006 (ICPSR 
20302), 2007 ( ICPSR 28187), 2008 (ICSPR 26501), 2009 (ICPSR 28462), 2010 (ICPSR 33021), 2011 
(ICPSR 34422), 2013 (ICPSR 34973). 
5
 The European Social Survey (ESS) asks respondents if there is a political party they feel closer to than all 
other parties. While ESS has been conducted every two years since 2002, Turkey was included only in 
Round 2(2004) and Round4 (2008). Moreover the ESS had few questions about the EU that I could utilize 
as a dependent variable; the two questions that were asked did not really tap into evaluation of EU 
membership. One of the questions asked respondents to tell if they think European unification should go 
further or has already gone too far. The other one asked if the respondent trusts in European parliament or 
not. Hence, I continued to look for other surveys until I found vote intention question in Transatlantic 
Trends Surveys. 
6
 CCEB 2002.2, September-October 2002;  CCEB 2003.4, October-November 2003 
77 
annually since 2003; Turkey has been included since 2004. Due to some problems with 
the data provided by the survey, I had to exclude year 2012 from the analysis
7
. 
Nevertheless, these sources still provide me with the chance to analyze the partisan 
dynamics of EU support in Turkey over more than a decade. 
In Chapter 3, I investigated the role of domestic cues, including government 
support, and satisfaction with democracy in the formation of attitudes towards EU. 
However, I was not able to look at the link between voting intentions and EU support 
since the question was discontinued in EB surveys. One main advantage of using 
Transatlantic Trends Surveys is that the voting intention question is asked every year 
whereas in EB surveys, the question about respondent’s voting intention for the next 
national elections was asked only in 2002 and 2003. However, I am employing both sets 
of surveys because Turkey was not included in the Transatlantic Trends Surveys until 
2004; using both sets of surveys thus provides the longest available view of partisan 
effects in shaping Turkish attitudes towards the EU. Using the Transatlantic Trends 
Surveys thus makes it possible to go beyond the analysis in Chapter 3 by adding a 
specifically partisan dimension.  In addition, looking at this second data source makes it 
possible to re-test some of the hypotheses reviewed in Chapter 3, to see if the new data 
confirm the previous chapter's findings. Unfortunately, the questions in the two surveys 
only partially overlap, meaning that such a re-test can be done only for the hypotheses 
about the effect of educational attainment and belonging to a certain occupational group. 
                                                 
The 2012 survey did not ask the question that is my dependent variable, whether Turkey’s EU membership 
would be a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing. 
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Therefore, I can not fully replicate the analysis of Chapter 3. Another drawback of using 
Transatlantic Trends Surveys is that although there are many questions asked specifically 
on the topic of Turkey’s EU membership, such as opinion about the benefits of EU 
membership for Turkey’s economy or opinion about likelihood of Turkey’s membership, 
they are not regularly asked. Therefore, I was not able to include them in the analysis. 
Changing Turkish Attitudes towards the EU  
Figure 4.1 shows how the Turkish public evaluated EU membership between the 
years 2002-2013. Note that the data points for the year 2002 and the year 2003 belong to 
the EB series whereas the years afterwards belong to Transatlantic Trends Survey.  It is 
important to note that the data confirms the same decline that the EB data shows in the 
previous chapter (Figure 3.1). Transatlantic Trends data gives the same story as EB data 
about changing Turkish attitudes towards the EU.  In 2002, 67 percent of the respondents 
expressed a positive view of EU membership. In 2004, Euro-enthusiasm reached its peak 
when 73 percent of the Turkish public said EU membership is a good thing. Then, we 
observe a drastic decline in support for the EU after the start of accession negotiations in 
2005. Since then, the graph shows some ups and downs in the level of support while 
Turkey and EU relations were also having their own ups and downs. After 2005, the 
highest level of support is 54 percent while the lowest level of support is 38 percent. In 
2013, only 44 percent of the public said that EU membership is a good thing. The graph 
looks slightly different than the graph provided in the previous chapter. However, it is 
also important to note that we lost one data point for year 2012 and there is one additional 
year, 2013. 
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Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the EU 
would be…? 
 
Figure 4.1 Public Support for the EU, 2002-2013  
Source : (CCEB 2002 and CCEB 2003, Transatlantic Trends Surveys, 2003-2013) 
 
% of Different Party Constituents Saying EU is a Good Thing 
 
Figure 4.2 Level of Public Support for the EU, by Political Party 2002-2013
8
 
Source: (CCEB 2002and CCEB 2003, Transatlantic Trends Surveys, 2003-2013) 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Vote intention question in the CCEB 2003 survey does not include MHP in the list of the parties. 
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Figure 4.2 depicts the changing attitudes towards EU over time for the three party 
constituents. The graph shows that CHP voters started out very positive declined to the 
lowest level in 2008, and then became slightly more positive. The highest support among 
the CHP voters was observed in 2002 with a value of 87 percent. AKP voters were not 
that enthusiastic in the beginning; however this changed quickly and they become pro-
Europeans in the following years. In 2002, 63 percent of AKP voters said EU 
membership was a good thing while in the following years, 74 percent of AKP voters 
said EU membership was a good thing. MHP voters were always the least supportive, but 
this also showed change. MHP voters were not as enthusiastic as other parties’ 
constituents about the pursuit of EU membership. In 2013, 54 percent of AKP supporters, 
36 percent of CHP supporters and 35 percent of MHP supporters state that EU is a good 
thing. 
 Yilmaz (2006) draws attention to the attitudinal change between AKP voters and 
CHP voters. In his data, CHP voters become Euro-sceptic while AKP voters become 
Euro-enthusiastic. Figure 4.2 suggests a similar pattern between AKP voters and CHP 
voters, especially at the beginning. In a later study Gulmez (2013) refers to the attitudinal 
shift in AKP and CHP at the party level from euro-supportiveness to euroscepticism. The 
graph depicts the decline in support for all party constituents. However, this is least 
observed among AKP voters. 
Model and Variables 
The dependent variable is the same survey question that I used in Chapter 3. The 
question is as follows “Generally speaking, do you think your country’s membership of 
the EU would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?”  I will run ordered 
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probit regression.  As mentioned before, interpretation of coefficients for independent 
variables in an ordered probit model is not straightforward. Therefore, I will employ 
Clarify software to calculate first differences to offer more meaningful interpretation of 
the results. 
The independent variables are vote choice, education, age, gender and occupation. 
Based on the question about voter intention for the next national elections, I constructed 
three dummy variables for three parties: AKP, CHP and MHP. As I mentioned before, 
these parties are selected to study due to their vote share in the elections for the last 
decade.  The base group includes the respondents who said they were going to vote for 
other parties or respondents who said don’t know/won’t vote. 
Results  
Testing the Effect of Party Support Over Time  
 
Table 4.3 shows the results for ordered probit analysis of attitudes towards the EU 
for the period 2002-2013.  In 2002, the dummy variable for AKP voter is statistically 
significant and the coefficient has a negative sign. In other words, if the respondent is 
AKP voter, she/he is less likely to say EU membership is a good thing. In 2003, this 
variable is again statistically significant but the sign of the coefficient is positive. In that 
case, if the respondent is AKP voter, she/he is more likely to support EU member. We 
witness the change in attitudes among AKP voters from Eurosceptic stance to Pro-
European stance over a short period of time. Since then, most of the years (2005, 2006, 
2007, 2010, 2011 and 2013), the variable is statistically significant and the coefficient has 
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positive sign suggesting that AKP voters continued to have pro-European stance over the 
years.  
In 2002, the dummy variable for CHP voter is statistically significant and has 
positive sign. In other words, if the respondent is a CHP voter, she/he is more likely to 
support EU membership. In the following years, the variable is no longer significant 
while the sign of the coefficient is sometimes negative.  
 The dummy variable for MHP is statistically significant only for years 2004 and 
2007 and it has negative sign. The respondents who express their support for MHP when 
asked about their vote intentions for next national elections is less likely to say EU is a 
good thing . Though insignificant, the coefficient for MHP variable has negative sign 
most of the time.  
In order to interpret the size of these effects, we can use predicted probabilities to 
simulate the effects.  Table 4.4 shows the change in predicted probability of a respondent 
saying the EU is a good thing when the specific party variable is changed from 0 to 1 
while the other party variables are set to 0, party of interest is set to 1 and all control 
variables are set to their mean values. If the respondent says that he/she will vote for 
AKP for the next elections, the effect on the probability of saying EU membership is a 
good thing is negative 0.09 percent in 2002 while the effect is positive 0.06 in 2003. In 
2007, the effect is positive 0.15.  We observe the greatest impact of this variable in 2013 
with a value of positive 0.19. 
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Simulation results for year 2002 indicate that CHP variable has a substantive 
effect with a value of 0.16 on the probability of respondent saying EU is a good thing.  
When the respondent expresses his/her intention to vote for MHP for the next 
elections, the effect on the probability of saying EU membership is a good thing is 
negative 0.28 percent in 2004. In 2007, the magnitude of the effect is less than 2004 but 
still a high value. It is negative 0.19. 
The results partially support the hypotheses. For some years, our findings are in 
line with our expectations. While evaluating the results, I would like to put emphasis on 
the question of which party was in the government and which party was in the opposition 
at the time of survey. The 2002 survey was conducted from September through October 
2002 while the 2002 General elections took place in November. When the 2002 survey 
was conducted, there was a coalition government between Democratic Left Party 
(Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) and Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and MHP. 
In 1999 elections, CHP failed to pass the 10 percent threshold and was not represented in 
the parliament. In terms of political position and ideology, DSP and CHP share the same 
values. DSP was founded by Bulent Ecevit, former leader of CHP party. Both of the 
parties situate themselves in the centre left and identify Kemalism and social democracy 
as their ideology.ANAP situates itself centre right and identifies economic liberalism, 
social conservatism and nationalism as its ideology. AKP was founded in 2001 and came 
to power with 2002 elections. 
As expected, AKP voters are less likely to support EU membership before AKP 
comes to power. However, we witness that once AKP is in power, there is an attitudinal 
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change among AKP constituents in terms of their views about EU. Over time the effect 
continues to be positive.  In 2007, the survey was conducted in June and elections took 
place in July 2007.  The effect of the AKP variable on attitudes was substantially high in 
this year. The effect of the MHP variable was also high compared to other years. It is 
possible that MHP became more critical of the EU project to attract votes from its base, 
which is already sceptic of the EU compared to other party constituents during the 
campaign period. “EU support is not typical of the MHP’s constituency, since the MHP 
voter is considered to be rather Eurosceptic” (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2007 cited in 
Avci 2011) 
In 2010, we see again that party support is a good predictor of attitudes towards 
EU among AKP voters. This is the year when the Turkish constitutional referendum took 
place. The support level was highest in 2013. It is interesting to note that survey took 
place during the time of Gezi protests. In that time period, EU parliament had passed a 
resolution that criticizes the government’s actions during the Gezi Park event and Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, former prime minister had declared that his government does not 
recognize the resolution. In this case, we see that party constituents failed to adopt the 
position of their party quickly. It is possible to speculate that they might need more time 
to acquire the information from their environment and use this new information to form 
their opinion. 
When we look at CHP voters, we see that they were highly supportive of the EU 
project in 2002 before the elections. However, once AKP came to power and CHP 
became the main opposition party, we do not see the continuation of this effect but we do 
not see significant negative effect. Gulmez (2013) states that when CHP took its place in 
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the parliament as the main opposition party, it became highly critical of EU’s 
conditionality. Celep (2011) argues that CHP’s skepticism towards EU was not expected 
as CHP was historically committed to the development of EU relations. Furthermore, the 
author explains that this was not an ideological change but it was due to CHP’s position 
in opposition and its fight with AKP electorally and politically. Based on the hypothesis 
about CHP, we normally would expect that following party cues, CHP voters would 
adopt a highly critical stance. But, we do not see this completely. Indeed, this seems to 
support the observation by Yilmaz (2011: 20) that “Euroscepticism is relatively new to 
CHP constituency and has not yet become a firm and fixed characteristic of this group”. 
It is also possible to argue that if CHP’s skepticism was not towards the very essence of 
EU membership as mentioned by Celep (2011), then we would not also see critical views 
of EU membership among CHP voters. 
Re-testing the Impact of Economic Variables Over Time 
As mentioned above, the Transatlantic Trends Surveys allow us to re-test some of 
the findings from Chapter 3 about other factors that influence EU support in Turkey.  
However, this re-testing is necessarily limited to a small number of variables that are 
regularly used in both surveys for the period 2004-2013. In terms of educational 
attainment effect, the education variable is statistically significant and the coefficient has 
positive sign in 2002.
9
 In other words, the higher the level of education the respondent 
has, the more likely he/she is to support EU membership. This is in line with Gabel’s 
hypothesis regarding human capital. However, we do not observe any significant relation 
between level of education and attitudes towards EU in the following years. When we 
                                                 
9
 The data for year 2002 is from CCEB survey 
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look at the effect of occupational group variables on attitudes towards EU, we observe 
that the professional variable is never significant while the manual worker variable is 
statistically significant only in 2010 and 2011. The sign of the coefficient is negative. In 
other words, if the respondent is manual worker, she/he is less likely to support EU 
membership. Similar to the findings from Chapter 3, occupational group variables do not 
seem to be a consistently good predictor of attitudes towards the EU.  To the extent that 
there is a relationship, the negative attitudes of manual workers are contrary to the 
predictions of hypothesis 4.  
Testing the Party Effect and Re-testing the Impact of Economic 
Variables by Using Pooled Data 
 
As  mentioned in the beginning of the chapter,  I will now look at the effect of the 
variables on the dependent variable by repeating the analysis using pooled data. Using 
pooled data contributes to the increased statistical power and will provide further 
assessment of the variables. Table 4.5 provides the results of our analysis with pooled 
data. According to the results, AKP variable is statistically significant and has a positive 
sign. If the respondent is an AKP voter, he/she is more likely to express support for the 
EU membership. CHP variable is also statistically significant and has a positive sign. In 
that case, CHP voters are also more likely to support the EU membership. By looking at 
the change in predicted probabilities table 4.6, we can compare the size of the impact 
between CHP and AKP voters.  The effect of AKP voter on the likelihood of saying EU 
membership is a good thing is positive 0.10 percent while the effect of CHP voter on the 
likelihood of saying EU membership is a good thing is 0.05 percent. If the respondent is 
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MHP voter, she/he is less likely to support EU membership. Simulations results the 
reveal that the impact of MHP variable on the dependent variable is negative 0.08.  
Furthermore, the re-testing of the economic variables show that occupational 
group variables do not play any role in the formation of opinion while the education 
variable is positive and statistically significant.  Table 4.6 shows the impact of the change 
on the dependent variable when there is a change in the education variable from its 
minimum to its maximum value for each of the constituent group. I found only 
significant impact on AKP voter. It is a small effect with a value of positive 0.03. In other 
words, increasing the education level for MHP and CHP did not matter for support level.  
Summary 
One of the main findings of this chapter is that party voters most of the time 
mimic the party stances of their parties when it comes to opinion about EU. Scholars who 
study political party positions had found that CHP had switched its position from a pro-
European party to a Eurosceptic party. When MHP was in coalition between the years 
1999 and 2002, party’s stance towards EU was classified as soft Eurosceptic by Yilmaz 
(2011).  However, after it left coalition, it adopted more sceptic position towards EU. 
After 2002 elections, AKP party came to with a pro-European agenda. Building on the 
study of Zaller (1992) that argues public opinion is cued by political elites, Gabel and 
Scheve (2007) identify a causal effect of elite opinion on individual opinion formation. 
Basically, the authors argue that if there is an elite consensus in the member countries of 
the European Union, mass public opinion is also favorable. Accordingly, decreasing 
consensus or increasing polarization implies less favorable elite messages about Europe. 
In that respect, the authors conclude that negative elite messages about European 
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integration do indeed decrease public support for Europe. The Turkish case seems to be 
in line with Gabel and Scheve’s argument that when there was consensus among the 
political parties, the support for the EU integration was high, but that this weakened as 
elite opinion became more divided. Turkish public opinion is like EU opinion, in that 
public opinion is sensitive to elite consensus/division. The chapter drew attention to the 
importance of party cues in explaining EU support among the respondents. 
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Table 4.3a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences, 
2002-2006 
 
 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  
AKP -0.266 * 0.188 * -0.083  0.369 *** 0.207 * 
 0.12  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.09  
CHP 0.565 ** 0.123  -0.148  0.222  0.154  
 0.18  0.15  0.17  0.15  0.16  
MHP -0.362    -0.756 ** -0.268  -0.125  
 0.19    0.25  0.17  0.18  
Education 0.213 ** 0.081  -0.029  0.081  -0.012  
 0.07  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07  
Professional -0.096  0.150  -0.002  0.049  -0.159  
 0.12  0.12  0.16  0.12  0.17  
Manual 
Worker 
0.035  -0.011  -0.046  0.045  0.15  
 0.17  0.14  0.17  0.14  0.13  
cut1           
_cons -0.885 *** -1.03 *** -1.67 *** -0.87 *** -0.992 *** 
 0.21  0.21  0.23  0.18 0.19  
cut2           
_cons -0.253  -0.412 * -1.08 *** -0.291  -0.444 * 
 0.20  0.20  0.22  0.18  0.19  
chi2 38.4 * 10.3  11.8  29.8 * 24.1 * 
Log Likelihood -575.22  -653.442  -554.939  -765.238  -819.995  
Pseudo R 
square 
0.03  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  
Number of 
obs. 
751  828  806  873  859  
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients with standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.   
Transatlantic Trend surveys (2004-2013), CCEB surveys (2002 &2003) 
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Table 4.3b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences, 
2007-2013 (continued) 
 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2013  
AKP 0.378 *** 0.169  0.14  0.335 *** 0.193 * 0.47 *** 
 0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.10   
CHP 0.153  -0.237  -0.035  0.069  0.134  0.181   
 0.18  0.15  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.13   
MHP -0.527 *** 0.046  -0.157  -0.15  -0.255  -0.019   
 0.17  0.16  0.15  0.18  0.17  0.16   
Education -0.003  -0.13  0.064  0.029  -0.027  -0.031   
 0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.05  0.07   
Professional 0.094  -0.141  -0.246  -0.047  -0.139  0.273   
 0.14  0.14  0.15  0.16  0.13  0.14   
Manual 
Worker 
0.002  -0.011  -0.205  -0.277 * -0.282 * 0.129   
 0.12  0.13  0.11  0.13  0.12  0.11   
cut1             
_cons -0.465 * -0.824 *** -0.646 *** -0.462 *** -0.588 *** -0.216   
 0.20  0.19  0.20  0.20  0.17  0.19   
cut2             
_cons 0.034  -0.277  -0.028  0.146  -0.134  0.132   
 0.20  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.17  0.19   
chi2 46.8  20 * 10.8  23.7 * 18.4 ** 41.4 *** 
Log Likelihood -812.547  -863.597  -837.549  -855.636  -921.619  -762.014  
Pseudo R squ 0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  
Number of 
obs. 
805  829  830  810  924  793   
 
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients with standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.   
Transatlantic Trend surveys (2004-2013), CCEB surveys (2002 &2003)
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Table 4.4 Change in Predicted Probabilities 
 
Note: Cell reports change in the predicted probability of a hypothetical respondent saying “EU membership is a good thing” when the specific party 
variable is changed from 0 to 1 while the other party variables are set to 0, specific party is set to 1 and all control variables are set to their mean values. 
* p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2013 
 AKP -0.10 * 0.06 * -0.03 
 
0.13 * 0.08 * 0.149 * 0.07 
 
0.06 
 
0.13 * 0.08 * 0.19 * 
CHP  0.15 * 0.04 
 
-0.05 
 
0.07 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 MHP -0.13 
   
-0.27 * -0.11 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.19 * 0.02 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.01 
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Table 4.5 Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences 
 
   
AKP 0.254 *** 
 0.03   
CHP 0.122 *** 
 0.042   
MHP -0.213 *** 
 0.053   
Education 0.039 ** 
 0.02   
Professional -0.058   
 0.042   
Manual  -0.047   
 0.04   
Year -0.078   
 0.004   
cut1   
_cons -157 *** 
 8.63   
cut2   
_cons -157 *** 
 8.63   
chi2 462.61  
Log Likelihood -7944.7   
Pseudo R squ 0.03   
Number of obs. 8280   
Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors under the coefficients. 
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.   
Transatlantic Trends surveys (2004-2013), CCEB surveys (2002 &2003) 
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Table 4.6 Change in Predicted Probabilities 
 2002-2013  
AKP 0.10 * 
CHP 0.05 * 
MHP -0.08 * 
   
Education_AKP 0.03 * 
Education_CHP 0.03  
Education_MHP 0.03  
Note: Cell reports change in the predicted probability of a hypothetical respondent saying “EU membership 
is a good thing” when the specific variable is changed from its minimum to maximum value while the other 
party variables are set to 0, specific party is set to 1 and all control variables are set to their mean values. * 
p < 0.05 
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CHAPTER 5 – 
Conclusion 
 
The study of public attitudes towards the EU first conceptualized as support for 
integration and later as Euroscepticism, has been the focus of academic research for a 
long time. While many factors are involved in determining public opinion, the existing 
theoretical framework for understanding attitudes toward the EU has emphasized the role 
of economic considerations (Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998), domestic 
political considerations (Anderson 1998), and identity (Hooghe, and Marks 2004; 
McLaren 2002). In this research, I have studied the evolution of public opinion in Turkey 
towards EU over the past decade in order to answer two main questions: (1) Do 
previously-developed theories of support for EU integration adequately explain the 
Turkish case?  In other words, is Turkey really different from other countries that are 
candidates to the EU? (2) Can a single model be adequate to explain opinion on an issue 
whose salience and political meaning have shifted over time?  To answer these two 
questions, I have tested several hypotheses developed out of the main theoretical 
approaches using longitudinal data. In this concluding chapter, I will briefly refer to the 
results of the hypothesis testing and summarize the main findings.  
Main Findings 
Domestic Political Considerations 
Hypothesis 6 and 7 dealt with testing the effect of domestic political 
considerations. The tests in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that they are only partly supported. 
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The advantage of using two different data series was that I was able to test the effect of 
government support and system support in Chapter 3 while I looked at the effect of 
specific party support in Chapter 4. In my study, I found that the attitudes toward the 
incumbent government and party preference matter most of the time while system 
support measured as satisfaction with democracy was only significant in year 2001. The 
results suggests that while citizens use the context of domestic politics to formulate their 
opinion, the type of the proxies that they choose to depend on varies across cases and 
across time.  
The question then arises: why was system support a good predictor of attitudes 
towards the EU in 2002 but not in other years? Kalaycioglu (2010) separates the effect of 
the EU on the democratization of the Turkish political regime into two periods. The first 
one includes the years 1993-2002, in which reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria were 
discussed in a multi-partisan environment and were part of national project shared by all 
political parties. The second period includes the aftermath of 2002 elections, in which 
constitutional amendments to meet EU criteria were presented as a partisan 
accomplishment of the AKP. It is possible that collaboration among different parties to 
realize the reforms led people link their views about functioning of democracy to their 
views about the EU in 2002. 
Looking at the effect of specific party support on the views about EU membership 
in Chapter 4, we see that the change in attitudes of party constituents reflects the change 
in their party’s stance towards the EU, as hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 predict. In brief, AKP 
voters switched from a Eurosceptic view of EU to a Pro-European view when AKP 
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became the governing party that was in charge of relations with EU. On the other hand, 
CHP supporters closely mirrored the position of their party. When the CHP had a pro-
European stance in 2002, CHP constituents also tended to be positive when asked about 
EU membership. In later years, when the CHP adopted Eurosceptic rhetoric, we observe 
that party support variable for CHP voters is no longer a good predictor in explaining 
their attitudes towards EU. After 2002, the sign of the coefficient is sometimes negative 
but never significant. After MHP left the coalition government, it adopted more skeptical 
stance. Hence, attitudes of MHP voters reflected their party’s position in the following 
years. 
Economic Considerations 
Because the EU’s roots go back to the EEC, with its goal of promoting affluence 
and economic efficiency, scholars (Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel, and Whitten 
1997) have investigated the effect of economic conditions on the evaluations of EU 
membership and have found that economic evaluations do play an important role in 
determining public opinion on EU. I also examined whether Turks incorporate their 
expectations regarding national economy and personal financial situation when 
answering questions about the EU.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 dealt with economic evaluations.  
As expected, I found that Turks associate their economic evaluations to their views on 
EU membership. Focusing on a time span of 10 years enabled me to observe the 
dynamics of this relation. It is important to note that the effect of economic evaluations 
changed its character over time. At first, the relationship between sociotropic economic 
evaluations and EU support was positive. In recent years, it became negative. This raises 
the question of why we see a change in the direction of the effect of economic 
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evaluations. The most likely explanation seems to be that this change coincides with the 
change in the relative economic conditions for Turkey and the EU. In the aftermath of the 
global economic crisis, Turkey’s economic performance was much better than many 
countries in the Eurozone countries. As a result, the number of Turkish respondents who 
associate the EU with economic prosperity also declined over time. 
A third set of hypotheses was about the effect of education and occupational 
skills. Based on the idea that human capital determines a person’s adaptability to the 
changes introduced by the liberalization of labor market, Gabel (1998) hypothesized that 
lower skilled workers are likely to have more negative evaluations of European 
integration. In reaction, Brinegar and Jolly (2005) underlined that to understand how 
skills might matter, we need to look at national factor endowments and varieties of 
capitalism. Turkey is a labor abundant country compared to Western European countries. 
Accordingly, in Chapter 3, I hypothesized that low skilled workers would be more likely 
to support EU membership due to the opportunities that arise from free movement. In my 
analysis, I found that the manual worker variable was significant only in two years. In 
2007, the finding for manual worker was in line with Brinegar and Jolly’s expectation 
that manual workers will be more likely to support EU membership; in contrast, in 2012, 
the finding for manual worker was in line with Gabel’s hypothesis that manual workers 
will be less likely to support EU membership. In other words, the results were indecisive, 
with the bigger message seeming to be that this factor is not consistently relevant for 
determining attitudes in this area.   
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That raises the question of why occupational variables were not a good predictor. 
These findings and my findings on professional status and education (not consistent 
predictors) seem more in line with Ehin (2001), and Elgun and Tillman (2007). Perhaps, 
as Elgun and Tillman state, a revision of the utilitarian theory human capital hypothesis is 
necessary. Elgun and Tillman (2007, 397) point out that the findings for two samples 
(2004 accession states and post 2004 candidate countries) differed as citizens in the 
second group of countries do not link their occupational status or educational attainment 
to their attitudes.  The authors explain that the impact of human capital is contingent on 
exposure to the distributive consequences of European integration. In the Turkish case, it 
is possible to argue that the credibility of Turkey’s membership was far from clear.  This 
might explain why individuals do not incorporate their occupation status when forming 
their opinion: in other words, they fail to see it as something that is likely to have direct 
personal consequences for their livelihood. Another explanation might be that manual 
workers have no intention of moving to seek work. Further research might look if manual 
workers’ answers would change if they are presented in a survey with a framing that EU 
membership is in close future or if they are asked whether they intend to benefit from 
freedom of movement in the future. 
In terms of educational attainment, only in 2000 do the findings support the 
hypothesis that people with a higher level of education are more likely support 
membership. Later time periods never again show a significant positive relationship. 
Moreover, in 2012, the relationship is significant but it is not in the theoretically expected 
direction. At this point, when the level of education increases, people become less likely 
to associate EU as a good thing. This also shows that the Turkish case does not fit to the 
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expectations regarding the effect of education when we focus on changes in attitudes over 
time. Only in pooled data, we find support for the positive effect of education when 
looking at specific party effect. However, the effect was very small.  
Identity 
 As Arikan (2012) stresses, since most of the Turkish accession debate revolves 
around national identity, the Turkish case provides an opportunity to test whether  
identity has an impact when people are answering questions regarding EU membership. 
McLaren (2004) draws attention to the role of feelings when explaining opposition to the 
European integration. She argues that the EU can be seen as a threat to the long 
established national identities by the citizens. When studying the effect of fear of loss of 
national identity due to integration, McLaren finds that while large proportions of EU 
citizens do indeed fear that the EU is threatening their national identity and culture, this 
effect is not all that substantial. She underlines that other factors play an equal or greater 
role in explaining individual-level opposition to the EU.  
In contrast, in the Turkish case, I found that associating the EU with loss of 
cultural identity on support for the EU had a consistent and substantial effect. The people 
who identified the EU with loss of cultural identity were less likely to say EU 
membership is a good thing.  This effect endured across the entire decade (2002-2012), 
with the effect seeming to stay the same as time progressed. The only exception was the 
year 2005, perhaps because this was the year when accession negotiations were opened 
with Turkey. 
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The Challenges of Imperfect Data 
Though surveys provide us with important information to investigate public 
opinion, they are far from perfect. Most painfully, we are limited by the questions that 
were previously and consistently asked when we try to reconstruct the evolution of 
attitudes on any issue. To study Turkish attitudes towards the EU, I relied on 
Eurobarometer surveys in Chapter 3. I was able to look at a time span of 10 years 
between 2002 and 2012. Eurobarometer surveys are commonly used in research 
analysing support for EU integration. One advantage for scholars is that they can 
replicate other studies and build on their work. In my case, using Eurobarometer surveys 
enabled me to compare my findings to other studies that focused on different cases. Many 
of the questions are asked regularly. Although I did not have a panel data, the fact that the 
same questions were asked regularly enabled me to look at changes in attitudes over time. 
Paradoxically, however, this advantage at the same time limited the scope of my 
investigation, because I needed to work only with questions that were continuously 
asked.  
Despite its importance as a variable, the vote intention question is asked only a 
few times in EB surveys. Therefore, I was not able include this variable in my model in 
Chapter 3. Accordingly, I searched for an alternative survey that asks a question about 
which party the respondent supports. Transatlantic Trends Surveys include a question 
about vote intention for the next national elections and it is asked every year. Since these 
surveys have also the same question that I used as a dependent variable previously; I 
decided to use Transatlantic Trends Surveys to further the question on the relation 
between party cues and attitudes towards EU. Nevertheless, Transatlantic Trends Surveys 
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did not have the other questions that I utilized previously, so I was unable to precisely 
replicate my analysis for Chapter 3 using Transatlantic Trend Surveys. 
Even given these challenges in finding appropriate data, it was encouraging to see 
that Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provided very similar messages about which factors have 
been shaping Turkish attitudes towards the EU.  For instance, occupational status and 
education were not consistently important in either survey.  Similarly, both showed a 
similar change over time in basic approval of the EU.  
 In the tradition of studies about attitudes towards the EU, researchers have used 
case studies of single countries to examine whether a country’s specific characteristics 
have an impact on attitudes towards EU. One distinctive national characteristic that might 
have been expected to influence attitudes towards the EU was that Turkey’s population is 
predominantly Muslim, something that distinguishes it from other EU countries. The role 
of “Muslim Identity” of Turks in shaping EU citizens’ perceptions of Turkey’s 
membership has been studied by scholars (Carkoglu 2003; Kentmen 2008). It would be 
interesting to examine whether having a Muslim identity affects Turkish public opinion 
on EU membership.  Here again, however, my study came up against data limits, because 
the question regarding religiosity has not been asked regularly in either of my surveys. 
Some of the EB surveys did include a question on “religious practice”, but other scholars 
have shown that this is not a good measure for capturing this concept (cf. Carkoglu 2003, 
182).  Unfortunately, I was not able to incorporate this variable. 
In other words, this dissertation has been an attempt to tease as much as possible 
out of imperfect data sources.  We are lucky that so many surveys in the twenty-first 
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century have regularly asked Turkish citizens about their attitudes towards the EU.   The 
question of EU membership has been an important one in these years, but the political 
and economic context of membership has changed.  Thus, we are able to learn a great 
deal about the factors driving opinion formation by looking at trends across these 
separate surveys.  Nevertheless, if I had the opportunity to conduct my ideal survey to 
study Turkish public opinion, I would include questions about party preference, 
religiosity and knowledge questions about EU. I would also like to include a better 
measurement to tap into the effect of national identity on attitudes. 
What cannot be remedied at this point is the lack of good surveys prior to 2002.  
Turkey applied to EU membership in 1959. However, up until 1991, we did not see any 
attempts to conduct surveys. The initial surveys in the 1990s were important, but they had 
problems with sampling. According to Carkoglu, (2003) the samples were not 
representative of all country. It is too late to remedy this problem, but hopefully if 
scholars make good use of existing data they can make a persuasive case for the 
continued inclusion of these questions in regular surveys such as Eurobarometer, ESS 
and Transatlantic Trends. 
Conclusions and Implications for Policy and Research 
There is no doubting the fact that the debate about EU membership is an 
important aspect of Turkish politics. Turkey’s EU candidacy is no longer treated as a 
foreign policy issue, but has become a domestic policy issue because the candidacy for 
EU membership requires a broad set of policy adjustments and legal as well institutional 
changes.  This importance for Turkish politics is likely to continue in the foreseeable 
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future.  Turkey has been a candidate country since 1999, and negotiations are continuing 
with no end in sight. Before the accession negotiations opened in 2005, Turkish people 
were highly supportive of the EU project due to the prospect of entering the Union. 
Turkish support for the EU has declined over time, yet the project is still on the table.   
As the results of my analysis shows, party cues matter in determining public 
opinion on EU. In the case of Turkey, the linkage between political parties and public 
was an important determinant of attitudes towards EU because when parties change their 
stances about EU membership, their party constituents also followed them. Turkish case 
supports the argument of Taggart and Sczerbiak (2004) that the level of Euroscepticism a 
party adopts depends on whether that party is in the government or not.  
It is possible to argue that if there was a coalition government the EU project 
would be seen as national project rather than a project of only one party where AKP was 
pursuing its own priorities and vision through the reform processes.  Kalaycioglu (2010) 
points out that many evaluate AKP as a political organization of Islamist movement 
rather than a party of democracy. For the foreseeable future, a coalition government is not 
likely. Indeed, Ozbudun (2014, 155) states that “in power since 2002, winner of three 
consecutive elections with increasing majorities, the AKP qualifies as a predominant 
party.” Because of this, and because the EU is seen as a partner of AKP, opponents of the 
AKP are likely to question the EU reform process. If support from different constituents 
is required, then the reforms suggested by the EU should be negotiated by all major 
parties. Otherwise, the handling of the EU reform process by one party will be seen as 
partisan and non-transparent. Hence, even if it has a legislative majority, without the 
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support of other parties for the EU process, the government will lack the necessary public 
support for the realization of reforms.  As mentioned before, Turkish public opinion is 
like EU opinion, in that public opinion is sensitive to elite consensus/division. Following 
Gabel and Scheve (2007), I expect that if there is a consensus among Turkish political 
parties in the future as it was in the case of coalition government of 1999-2002, the 
support for the EU integration will increase. 
While my main approach was to test the theories in the existing literature to 
understand determinants of Turkish attitudes towards EU, I also emphasized the 
importance of looking at the context.  The change in the direction of the effect of national 
economic evaluations suggests that in eyes of public, the EU might no longer be seen as 
responsible for stabilization and economic development. Since, public opinion in Turkey 
seems to follow party support on this issue, parties’ positions are probably also 
influenced by their perceptions of which issues are popular.  In this regard, it seems 
unlikely that Turkish politicians or Turkish citizens will show much enthusiasm for 
Europe unless and until EU economic growth becomes positive relative to the Turkish 
economy. Then, in that case, political elite should put more emphasis on the political 
aspect of membership that includes democratization efforts. However, political reforms 
should be discussed and negotiated until there is a consensus reached by different 
political parties. If there is one party in charge of the negotiation process, that party 
should consult the opposition so that reform process is not exploited by a party who 
wants to pursue only its own interests rather than national interests. Only then, support 
for EU membership can increase and the prospect of EU membership becomes likely. 
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The loss of cultural identity variable has a consistently strong effect on the 
attitudes. If people are less likely to support EU membership due to their fear of losing 
cultural identity, perhaps framing that presents the issue in a positive way such as cultural 
diversity or cultural richness might lead more positive attitudes. 
This research showed that studying attitudes over time provides a more 
comprehensive and accurate picture of dynamics of public opinion. While research based 
on a snapshot might help us to understand attitudes towards EU for a specific year, we 
cannot extrapolate the results to other years. Focusing on attitudes over time pointed out 
that it is not only the effect of the variables in the model changes but sometimes the 
direction of the effect of the variables also changes. Hence, this study suggests that while 
testing the theories of support for EU integration, it is important to look at the 
background of how relations between a candidate country and the EU evolved, and to 
take account of changing economic and political situations.  In Turkey and elsewhere, we 
should expect public opinion on this issue to be dynamic, and to be influenced by factors 
both within and outside of the country. 
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APPENDIX –  
Survey Questions and Responses 
 
 
Eurobarometer Surveys 
 Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey’s membership to the EU 
would be…?  
o A good thing 
o A bad thing 
o Neither good nor bad 
o DK 
 
 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve 
months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to…?  
The economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) 
o Better  
o Worse 
o Same 
o DK 
 
 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve 
months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to…?  
The financial situation of your household 
o Better  
o Worse 
o Same 
o DK 
 
 I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend 
to trust it or not to trust it. The Turkish Government 
o Tend to trust  
o Tend not to trust 
o DK 
 
 What does the EU mean to you personally?  
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o Peace 
o Economic prosperity 
o Democracy 
o Social Protection 
o Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU 
o Cultural diversity 
o Stronger say in the world  
o Euro 
o Unemployment 
o Bureaucracy 
o Waste of money 
o Loss of cultural identity 
o More crime  
o Not enough control at external borders 
o Other 
o DK 
 
 On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY) 
o Very satisfied 
o Fairly satisfied 
o Not very satisfied 
o Not at all satisfied 
o DK 
 
 Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all 
proud to be Turkish?  
o Very proud 
o Fairly proud 
o Not very proud 
o Not at all proud 
 
 How old were you when you stopped full time education? 
o Still studying 
o No education 
o Age 
o Refusal 
 
 Gender 
o Male 
o Female 
 
 How old are you? (Age Scale) 
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o 15-24 years 
o 25-39 years 
o 40-54 years 
o 55 years and older 
 
 What is your current occupation? (Occupation Scale) 
o Self employed 
o Managers 
o Other white collars 
o Manual workers 
o House persons 
o Unemployed 
o Retired 
o Students 
 
 If there were a “General Election” tomorrow, which party WOULD YOU 
VOTE for? 
o Party names 
o Other Party 
o Would vote blank/would spoil the vote  
o Would not vote 
o DK/ no opinion 
o Refusal 
 
Transatlantic Trends Survey 
 Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey’s membership to the EU 
would be…?  
o A good thing 
o bad thing 
o Neither good nor bad 
o DK 
o Refusal 
 
 Vote intentions next elections 
o Party names 
o Not allowed to vote 
o Other party 
o No party, won’t vote/blank vote 
o DK/RA 
 
 Age when finished full time education 
o Never been in full-time education 
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o Still in full time education 
o Age 
o Refusal 
 
 Age (scale) 
o 18-24 years 
o 25-34 years 
o 35-44 years 
o 45-54 years 
o 55-64 years 
o 65 years 
 
 Gender 
o Male 
o Female 
 
 As far as your current occupation is concerned would you say you are self-
employed, an employee, a manual worker or would you say that you are 
without a professional activity? 
o Farmer, forester, fisherman 
o Owner of a shop, craftsman 
o Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.) 
o Manager of a company 
o Other self-employed (SPECIFY) 
o Professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect) 
o General management, director or top management 
o Middle management 
o Civil servant 
o  Office clerk 
o Other employee (salesman, nurse, etc.) 
o Other employee  
o Supervisor\ foreman (team manager, etc.) 
o Manual worker 
o  Unskilled manual worker 
o Other manual worker  
o Looking after the home 
o Student (full-time) 
o Retired 
o Seeking a job 
o Other without a professional activity  
o Refusal 
